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“[I]t is our judgment that the Clean Air Act
of 1970 is based in important part on a policy
of non-degradation.”
Sierra Club v. Ruckleshaus,
344 F. Supp. 253, 256 (1972).
I. Introduction
Emissions trading markets generally
measure their commodity — pollution — in
total tons of emissions within an airshed. But
when the contaminant traded causes localized
adverse health effects, this approach can fail
and allow trades that produce a net increase in
pollution — attributable to illness and injury.
The Clean Air Act (“CAA”) and state environ-
mental laws offer tools for environmentalists
and environmental justice advocates to chal-
lenge such trades and the trading systems that
produce them, particularly where they impact
densely populated communities of color.
Market based solutions have become the
method of choice for implementing environ-
mental law and policy. From trading water pol-
lution discharge rights under the Clean Water
Act1 to endangered species habitat trades,2
many recent developments in environmental
regulation have focused on taking market
based approaches to increase flexibility in and
reduce the cost of compliance with environ-
mental statutes. The CAA regulation of air pol-
lution sources has been no exception — incor-
porating both classic pollution credit trading
systems3 and requirements that new or
New Tools for
Environmental Justice:
Articulating a Net Health
Effects Challenge to
Emissions Trading Markets
By Nicklas A. Akers
 J.D. Harvard Law School 2000; M.P.H. Harvard School of
Public Health, 2000; B.A. University of California, Los Angeles,
1995. Mr. Akers is a member of the California Bar and is current-
ly law clerk to Chief Justice Christopher Armstrong of the
Massachusetts Appeals Court. This article was developed during
the 1999 seminar on land use planning and the environment at
Harvard Law School and supervised by Professor Charles Haar.
The Author wishes to thank Professor Kirsten Engel, Professor
Peter Salzman, Dr. Amy L. Hansen, M.D., Communities for a
Better Environment, and the members of the seminar on land
use planning and the environment for their assistance.  Any
errors are, of course, solely those of the Author.
1. See OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. E.P.A. Pub. No. E.P.A. 800-R-96-
001, DRAFT FRAMEWORK FOR WATERSHED-BASED TRADING (1996).
2. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Babbit, 15 F. Supp. 2d. 1274 (D. Ala.
1998).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b).
modified sources purchase offsetting4 "emis-
sion reduction credits."5 These approaches
were integral to the 1990 CAA Amendments6
and have been actively implemented by the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and
state and local agencies responsible for enforc-
ing the CAA.
These trading programs have stimulated
both active emissions markets and equally
active criticism by environmental and environ-
mental justice groups. Environmentalist critics
have focused on the moral and symbolic impli-
cations of pollutant trading and on failures in
implementation. Environmental justice critics
have claimed that the trading markets produce
"hot spots" of pollution centered in underrep-
resented communities.7 These trades are also
open to another critique because markets
organized around the commodity of pollution
measured in tons of emissions and blind to the
local health effects caused by the migration of
those emissions can allow trades that increase
the aggregate risk of death and disease in a
region.8 This paper applies public health tech-
niques to model and evaluate information
about Volatile Organic Compound ("VOC")
trading in one air market and considers two
case studies. These models show the potential
of VOC trading markets designed around tons
of emissions, rather than health effects, to fail
and allow trades that cause a net increased
burden on human health. These failures can
occur because of the differences in the com-
munities between which emissions are moved
and because of the differences in health effects
produced by the family of chemicals classed as
volatile organic compounds.
Emission credit trades allow the user to
increase emissions or to forego a reduction
that would otherwise be required by the base-
line of command and control regulations in
exchange for "excess" emissions reductions by
another facility.9 Excess emissions reductions
are judged against the baseline of command
and control emissions limits. Underlying such
a market system is the assumption of no net
negative effect — that a trade will not compro-
mise efforts to achieve pollution reductions in
providing flexibility to polluters. When the pur-
chaser of a credit uses it in a manner that has
more serious impacts on human health than
the seller's prior use of the credit had, the
transaction increases risk to human health. A
trade that produces a net negative effect such
as this betrays the promise that markets will
achieve flexibility without cost to pollution
reduction goals.10
In the legal arena, the CAA11 and state envi-
ronmental laws12 provide doctrinal tools to
challenge trades that produce a net negative
health effect. Environmental and environmen-
tal justice advocates should add a health-
based perspective, and the legal tools that
compliment it, to their current tool kit of pro-
cedural and disparate impact based legal chal-
lenges. In the policy forum, environmental reg-
ulators should adopt two reforms to classic
trading markets. First, data generation and dis-
tribution requirements should be instituted to
enable the modeling of trading system health
impact. Second, backstop requirements should
block trades which result in an aggregate
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4. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(1)(A).
5. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39617 (Deering
2001).
6. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(2)(A) (2001) (amended
1990).
7. Complaint and Memorandum for Relief from
Environmental Justice Violations, Cmtys. for a Better Env't. v. S.
Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. (E.P.A. No. 10R-97-R9) (filed July 23,
1997) (hereinafter “CBE Compl.”).
8. See discussion infra § 5B1b.
9. See supra text accompanying notes 23-33.
10. See Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, The
Comprehensive Approach to Global Climate Policy: Issues of Design and
Practicality, 9 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 83, 93 (1992) ("Under the acid
rain provisions of the 1990 Clean Air Act, ambitious sulfur control
requirements are extended to all utility sources. But sources are
allowed the flexibility to achieve reductions in any way they
choose — whether through use of scrubbers, low-sulfur coal, new
combustion technologies, or reduced electricity generation due
to conservation and demand-management techniques.
Moreover, sources that reduce sulfur emissions further than they
are required may sell their excess reductions to others who find
it more difficult or costly to achieve reductions.") Id.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q).
12. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 39600-39617
(Deering 2001).
II. The Place of Emission Credit Trading
Within the U.S. Clean Air Law
The United States system of air pollution
law employs regulation at the federal, state
and local levels implemented through a per-
mitting system for continuing, modified and
new emissions. The CAA13 establishes a gener-
al framework for this system. It requires the
EPA to set air quality standards — the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards
("NAAQS") for a variety of pollutants.14 These
pollutants include oxides of Nitrogen (NOx)
and Sulfur (SOx) and VOCs, (ozone precur-
sors).15 In areas where ambient air complies
with NAAQS, the CAA and EPA regulations
imposed thereunder require that local agencies
mandate emissions limitation so as to prevent
"significant deterioration" of air quality.16
In areas where ambient air does not com-
ply with the EPA's NAAQS, the CAA requires
that emissions controls and permitting sys-
tems be implemented to reduce the amount of
pollution and bring air quality into compliance
with the NAAQS.17 These regulations reach
many sources of pollutants. Subchapter I of the
Act deals with fixed sources.18 It establishes a
requirement for the review of new sources of
emissions,19 which is implemented through the
CAA Subchapter V source permitting system.20
New facilities must offset any increase in their
emissions through an equal or greater
decrease in their own or another facility's
emissions in the same area.21 The EPA's 1976
interpretive guidelines first described the
agency's approach to offsetting emissions
reductions from the same or another plant in
noncompliance areas.22
These offsets,23 or "Emission Reduction
Credits"24 can come from a facility's own opera-
tions, or reductions at another facility. "Internal"
trades are the most common.  A facility can shut
down or clean up one process and apply this
reduction in emissions to offset against new
emissions or foregone reductions from another
process.25 Conceptually, the EPA places a "bubble"
around an industrial facility. Emissions of the
plant as a whole, rather than individual opera-
tions, are subject to a permit so that an excess
reduction in one process' emissions can com-
pensate for an increase or failure to meet tar-
get emissions reductions in another process.
For example, consider a printing plant with five
presses. Instead of a separate permit covering
the VOC emissions of each press, the entire
plant is viewed as a whole. This approach pro-
vides facility managers with flexibility in
designing compliance plans. They are able to
select the processes that will receive techno-
logical "fixes" or those operations will be shift-
ed to sufficiently reduce overall emissions. In
the end, the quantity of emissions for each
"bubble" is meant to be less than or equal to
the amount of emissions that would have been
produced if the plant had installed the level of
control technology mandated by command
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13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 7409.
15. Id. VOCs are alternately referred to as reactive organic
gasses (ROGs), Volatile Organic Materials (VOMs), and hydrocar-
bons (HCs).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(I) (adopting an approach first
set forth by the D.C. District Court in Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344
F. Supp. 253 (D. D.C. 1972)).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7515.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a) (defining fixed sources).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(C) (discussing New Source
Review).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661-7661(e).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7503(a)(1)(A), 7503(b).
22. Air Quality Standards, 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524-25 (1976)
(interpretive ruling) (discussing offsets). See also Emissions
Trading Policy Statement, General Principles for Creation,
Banking, and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 47 Fed. Reg.
15,076 (Jan. 4, 1982) (proposed policy) (discussing emissions
reduction credit generation).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(1)(A).
24. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39617 (Deering
2001).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(g)(4)(A) (setting forth the CAA's
provisions relating to trading oxides of nitrogen (NOx) and
VOCs).
26. Trading under this system may allow a company to
make more cost effective reductions in emissions through flexi-
bility in what technology is adopted. If that is the case, the flexi-
bility may allow greater aggregate emissions reductions among
all polluters because of a reduction in the average cost of an
emissions reduction in comparison to a command and control
system.
The EPA also allows trades between facili-
ties.27 These trades have been the subject of
greater controversy than those within a single
facility. A facility that reduces its emissions of
a target substance by a greater amount than is
required by current law can market those addi-
tional reductions to new or modified sources.28
A hypothetical power plant that reduces its
emissions of SOx below the levels required by
law can sell those reductions to a new source,
such as a power plant just starting its opera-
tions. These external trades, like internal "bub-
ble" transactions, are meant to give flexibility
to business. Conceptually, they achieve the
same amount of aggregate emissions in the
basin as a classical command and control sys-
tem would. But they allow reductions to be
made where they cost the least.29 As described
within the EPA's emissions trading policy
statement, both of these approaches focus on
the total emissions from a process, the
"smokestack" approach, rather than the environ-
mental or human health impact of the emissions.30
The 1990 CAA Amendments required that
the EPA expand its use of market based or eco-
nomic incentive approaches.31 This has
prompted the expansion of programs that
allow facilities to substitute other facilities'
use of emissions controls above and beyond
those required for their own reductions in
emissions.32 These incentives markets are
largely created and administered by state and
local air pollution control agencies.33
The CAA delegates primary authority to
establish, implement, and enforce pollution
control regimes to the states under EPA-
approved State Implementation Plans
("SIPs").34 This structure has been described as
a "bold experiment in constitutional federal-
ism."35 As an example, in California, authority
at the state level is held by the California Air
Resources Board ("CARB"). In turn, it is dele-
gated by the states to counties or special
regional authorities, such as the South Coast
Air Quality Management District ("SCAQMD"),
which covers a multi-county area in the vicini-
ty of Los Angeles36 or the Bay Area Air Quality
Management District ("BAAQMD"), which has
jurisdiction over the counties of the San
Francisco Bay Area. Both the state agency and
the EPA must approve amendments to local
plans before they become effective.37
A number of states have been active in
constructing emissions trading markets. In the
Northeast, a multi-state coalition is working on
developing trading regimes in the Ozone
Transport Region for Oxides of Nitrogen
(NOx).
38 Illinois operates a system for trading
volatile organic material39 in the Chicago area.40
This program, the Emissions Reduction Market
System,41 is operated by the Illinois State EPA
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27. Air Quality Standards, 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524-25 (1976)
(interpretive ruling).
28. Id.
29. Emissions trading markets should in theory provide
signals to regulators about the actual cost of achieving reduc-
tions in emissions in various industries based upon the regulat-
ed community's willingness to purchase credits or reduce emis-
sions, and the cost of those credits. Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal
Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495, 1531-74 (1999)
("By creating a market in pollution (and emission control), the
1990 Clean Air Act established incentives for the generation of
information (particularly on the level of emissions and the costs
of control) on a highly disaggregated basis, making possible a
much more refined and cost-effective regulatory strategy and
encouraging action by those in a position to reduce SO2 and NOx
emissions at the lowest cost."). Id. at 1531.
30. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants for Source Categories, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,608, 62,683
(Dec. 21, 1992) (discussing the EPA's Emissions Trading Policy
Statement of December 4, 1986 at 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A).
32. See, e.g., SCAQMD Reg. XX.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a).
35. Bethlehem Steel v. Gorsuch, 742 F.2d 1028, 1036 (7th
Cir. 1984).
36. SCAQMD has jurisdiction over urban portions of Los
Angeles, Orange, San Bernardino and Riverside Counties. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40400 (Deering 2001).
37. Cmtys. for a Better Env’t v. Chevron, No. CV# 97-
5412DT(BQRx) (C.D. Cal. 1998); Maria Cone, Judge Rules Smog Plan
Cutbacks Illegal, LA TIMES, Oct. 6, 1998, at A1.
38. EPA Open Market Trading Rule for Ozone Smog
Precursors Proposed Policy Statement and Model Rule, 60 Fed.
Reg. 39,668, 39,670 (Aug. 3, 1995).
39. Volatile Organic Compounds ("VOCs") are referred to
as volatile organic materials ("VOMs") in the Illinois statutes and
regulations.
40. EPA Open Market Trading Rule for Ozone Smog
Precursors Proposed Policy Statement and Model Rule, 60 Fed.
Reg. 39,668, 39,670 (Aug. 3, 1995).
41. See 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/9.8 (West 2000); Ill. Reg.
Tit. 35 § 205.1 (West 2000).
emissions within the Chicago ozone reduction
region.42
In the Los Angeles air basin, SCAQMD has
focused its attention on reducing particulates,
NOx, O3, and O3 precursor substances such as
VOCs. The agency's "Regional Clean Air
Incentives Market" ("RECLAIM")43 allows sta-
tionary sources to trade among themselves
reductions in emissions of oxides of nitrogen
("NOx") and sulfur dioxide ("SO2")
44 in order to
comply with emissions limits. The agency has
proposed an expansion of the RECLAIM pro-
gram to include the trading of VOCs between
stationary sources.45
SCAQMD allows stationary sources to use
credits obtained from mobile sources — so-
called Mobile Source Emission Reduction
Credits ("MSERCS").46 The District’s "car scrap-
ping" program allows stationary sources and
credit brokers to purchase and scrap older,
functional vehicles registered in the district.47
The system operates under the assumption
that the vehicles to be scrapped are being used
in the air district, and that taking them off the
road will result in their replacement by the use
of lower polluting means of transit, either pub-
lic transit or newer, cleaner vehicles. The pro-
gram grants credits for these projected reduc-
tions of NOx and VOC.
48 MSERCS may be
earned directly by a stationary source operat-
ing its own scrapping program49 or by inde-
pendent scrappers, usually automotive junk-
yards, which sell the emissions reductions to
brokers or directly to the stationary sources.50
MSERCs are generated for reductions in NOx,
SO2 and VOCs. The system does not allow
inter-pollutant trading.  A reduction in one
substance, such as NOx, count toward a reduc-
tion in emissions of VOCs.51 This program
appears to be unique in allowing the exchange
of offsets between different types of sources —
mobile and stationary — and allowing the
credits generated to be applied to a number of
different stationary source emissions regula-
tions. Use of MSERCs has proved popular
among the Los Angeles area's oil refineries and
the associated marine terminals used to off-
load crude oil and transfer processed petrole-
um products to and from oil tankers moored
near San Pedro and El Segundo.52
The RECLAIM and car scrapping programs
are two examples of a general trend toward
market-based programs and away from com-
mand and control systems of regulation.53
Command and control regulations mandate
specific emissions control technology or set
specific emissions limits on process or facility
emissions without allowing burden-shifting
through trading.  In addition to the classic
trading programs discussed above, the
SCAQMD and other air quality authorities, as
part of the CAA required new source review —
the permitting process for new or modified
emitters of pollutants — require that new
emissions be offset.54 Any new emissions from
a new or modified facility must be offset by a
corresponding reduction in emissions from
another facility in the air quality control
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42. Id. See also http://epa.state.il.us/air/caapp/erms.html (last
visited Feb. 25, 2000) (containing a description of the program).
43. SCAQMD Regulation XX. For a discussion of RECLAIM
see SCAQMD, Reclaim Means, at http://www.aqmd.gov/reclaim/
reclaim.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2000).
44. SCAQMD has abandoned, at least temporarily, plans
to expand RECLAIM to encompass VOC trading, as many VOC
trades are based on "fugitive" emissions and reductions therein
are difficult to track. "Fugitive" emissions are those that do not
come from a traditional source, such as the proverbial tail pipe,
but come instead from leaks in a system, equipment servicing
and cleaning, and the like. Proposed SCAQMD Regulation XX
(1995) (including text of the proposed rules).
45. Proposed VOC Reclaim Report, SCAQMD Nov. 24,
1995, Proposed Revised Rule 2000 et seq. (RECLAIM is described
at Regulation XX). The agency appears to have abandoned its
attempts to expand RECLAIM. Marla Cone, Anti-Smog Plan Appears
Likely to Be Shelved, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1996, at A1.
46. SCAQMD R. 1610.
47. SCAQMD R.1610(c).
48. SCAQMD R.1610(a), (j).
49. For a discussion of RECLAIM, see authorities collect-
ed infra notes 78, 81, 85.
50. Id.
51. SCAQMD R.1610(i).
52. CBE Compl., supra note 7.
53. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(2)(C) (amended 1990);
OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. E.P.A., No. E.P.A. 800-R-96-001, DRAFT
FRAMEWORK FOR WATERSHED-BASED TRADING (1996) (discussing
watershed based trading under the Clean Water Act's NPDES sys-
tem.).
54. SCAQMD R.1303(b)(2), 1309.
55. SCAQMD R.1303(b)(2), 1309(d).
facility adopting emissions controls, changing
its operations to a process that pollutes less or
shutting down all or part of its facility. The
principal pollutants of interest in the SCAQMD
include oxides of nitrogen, ozone, particulates,
and ozone precursors — VOCs.56 The District's
offsetting program requires offsets — referred
to by SCAQMD as Emissions Reduction
Credits ("ERCs") for new sources of these sub-
stances.57 The amount of VOCs traded within
such systems is substantial. In 1998 alone,
California's air districts reported emissions
reduction credit transactions totaling 443 tons
of VOC emissions.58
The emission reduction credit program
also uses the bubble methodology (described
supra section II). Bubbles can serve as a
methodology for calculating "internal" offsets
from reductions in existing process emissions
that can allow increased emissions from new
processes.59 Generators of ERCs can also use
the bubble methodology to determine their
aggregate amount of "surplus" reduction that
can be transferred to a new source.60
Generators of ERCs need not be stationary
sources such as industrial facilities. SCAQMD
has recently expanded its program to include
emissions from non-SCAQMD-regulated small
sources.61 The Sacramento Air Quality
Management District ("SMAQMD") has allowed the
creation of ERCs from the replacement of small
gasoline powered engines with electrical devices
— such as for home gardening equipment.62 The
district also found that emission reduction credits
had been created by a reduction in emissions
from a non-SMAQMD regulated source — the
stand down of B-52 Bomber operations at a local
U.S. Air Force installation.63
Regardless of the source, these market or
quasi-market programs allow the transfer of
emissions from a shut down or reduced source
to a new or expanded source of emissions. The
programs allow these trades within the same
air district or control region with the intent of
providing flexibility in opening new facilities or
operating old ones while maintaining a con-
stant level of pollution in a region.  In other
terms, allowing no increased impact.64
The recent expansion of emissions credit
trading programs is not limited to programs
with substantial potential to create "hot spots"
at the community level. The CAA has estab-
lished a wide-scale interstate trading system for
sulfur emissions among states with coal-burn-
ing electrical utilities that release SO2, con-
tributing to the acid rain problem.65 The CAA
has also proposed additional study and
research of inter-pollutant SO2-NOx trading.
66
Pursuant to the Montreal Protocol67 on deple-
tion of stratospheric ozone, the CAA establish-
es transfer authority for emissions of ozone-
depleting chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), both
between U.S. states68 and among the countries
that are parties to the Montreal Protocol.69 The
Kyoto Protocol,70 which is focused on control-
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56. SCAQMD 1997 AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT PLAN, Ch. 2 (1997).
57. SCAQMD R. 1303(b)(2), 1309.
58. CAL. AIR RES. BD, EMISSIONS REDUCTION OFFSET
TRANSACTION COST SUMMARY REPORT FOR 1998 16 (Apr. 1999).
59. For a discussion of bubble methodologies under
RECLAIM, see SCAQMD, Reclaim Means, supra note 43; see also
Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (discussing bubble
methodology generally).
60. Reclaim Means, supra note 43.
61. SCAQMD R. 2506 (regulating area source credits for
NOx and SOx).
62. Mobile Source Emission Reduction Credits are regu-
lated by Sacramento Metropolitan Air Quality Management
District Rule 1005. See also Sacramento Metropolitan Air Quality
Management District, Mow Down Air Pollution 2000 http://www.
airquality.org/mobile/wrapup.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2000).
63. John Cox, Environmentalists Slam Smog Emission Credits,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 24, 1998, at B1 (describing the response of
CBE and other environmental groups).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(c) (limiting potential sources of off-
sets to those within the same non-attainment area as purchaser).
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651b(b), 7651c(f)(2).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(c).
67. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer,
Sept. 16, 1987. S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987) (in
force Jan. 1, 1989).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 7671(f).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 7671(o).
70. Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1(1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998).
emissions, also has provisions allowing trades
of carbon quotas.71 Some commentators have
proposed granting carbon emissions credits
for the preservation of carbon dioxide sinks,
such as tropical rainforest.72
III. Environmentalist and Environmental
Justice Critiques of Local Programs
Emissions trading has provoked strong cri-
tiques from environmental and environmental
justice organizations. Some critiques have
focused on trading in general as a method to
regulate the environment. Others have dealt
with specific applications of emissions trading,
including SCAQMD's car scrapping programs.
Generally, the programs have been attacked:
(1) based on principle — that emissions trad-
ing is morally wrong; (2) based on allegations
of faulty or fraudulent implementation; and (3)
based upon the disproportionate effect of
some programs in creating pollution "hot
spots" in poor communities of color.
Philosopher critics of emissions trading,
such as Harvard's Michael J. Sandel, have
argued that granting a property or quasi-prop-
erty right to pollute by commodifying pollution
undermines the goals of pollution prevention
and reduction that underlie environmentalism
and environmental law.73 Sandel observes that
"[i]f a company is fined. . . for spewing excessive
pollutant into the air, the community conveys
its judgment that the polluter has done some-
thing wrong. A fee, on the other hand, makes
pollution just another cost of doing business."74
He argues that society ought not to abandon a
nonmarket approach to pollution.75 In effect, a
"right" to pollute justifies and legitimates the
production of pollutants. It dilutes the moral
undertones of environmentalism.  If a polluter
has purchased a legally constructed and recog-
nized "right" to pollute, might it not undermine
our commitment to treat pollution as a social
evil needing to be controlled, albeit one linked
with socially useful activities?
Other critics of emissions trading have
focused on problems in program administra-
tion. The documentation of emission reduc-
tions is susceptible to easy manipulation and
policing is very difficult. Academics have
argued that emission credit markets lack the
internal controls built into many systems of
exchange.76 For example, absent liability
regimes and enforcement, purchasers of emis-
sion credits have no interest in the quality of
the emissions reduction they purchase.77 If one
ton of well-documented reduction and one ton
of marginally documented reduction give
equal right to pollute, the only basis for com-
petition in the credit market will be price.
SCAQMD's car scrapping program has
been repeatedly attacked for overestimating
the quantity of reductions for sale in the mar-
ket. Communities for a Better Environment
("CBE"), a California-based environmental jus-
tice organization, has repeatedly attacked the
program for allowing credit users such as
marine terminals and oil refineries to overstate
the air quality benefit from taking old vehicles
off the road.78 CBE argues that SCAQMD and
credit users have overestimated the remaining
usable life of the vehicles that were scrapped.79
CBE has also argued that the agency overesti-
mated the program's effectiveness by underes-
timating the age of the replacement vehicles
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71. Cost Free, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2000, at 64; The Rise of
the Sink, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2000, at 65 (noting that some pro-
pose expand trading under the Kyoto Protocol on global warming
to include credits from the preservation of sinks of carbon, such
as rainforest).
72. The Rise of the Sink, supra note 71.
73. Michael J. Sandel, It's Immoral to Buy the Right to Pollute,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997. See also Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing
Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 576 (1996) ("Our
sense of justice and fairness thus is offended when pollution
harms go uncompensated or uncontrolled.") Id.
74. Sandel, supra note 73.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., David Driesen, Free Lunch Or Cheap Fix?: The
Emissions Trading Idea And The Climate Change Convention, 26 B.C.
ENVTL. AFFAIRS L. REV. 1, 65 (1998) (arguing that a purchaser of an
emissions credit has no real "interest" in the quality or "work-
manship" behind the reduction).
77. Id.
78. Letter from Richard Drury, CBE, to Michael Kenny,
California Air Resources Board, 2 (Feb. 13, 1998); CBE Compl.,
supra note 7.
79. CBE Compl., supra note 7.
80. Id.
Bruce Lohmann, a former SCAQMD
employee charged with inspecting vehicles
being scrapped has reported that many of the
scrapped vehicles sat unused and therefore
had not contributed to any actual emissions.81
He noted that visual and functional inspec-
tions of vehicles submitted for scrap did not
require that the vehicles be legally operable on
a public way.82 Lohmann also described a num-
ber of cases where a vehicle owner brought a
nonfunctional car to a scrapper, who would
remove parts from other vehicles to make the
car pass the brief pre-acceptance inspection.83
At least one owner re-used the same engine
block from one vehicle in several different
chassis to collect repeated scrapping pay-
ments of $600-700.84 These critiques suggest
that overestimation of emissions reductions
may result in more credits for new emissions
being "produced" than is warranted by the
actual reductions.
Emissions trading programs have also
drawn criticism from the environmental justice
movement for their impact on poor communi-
ties and communities of color.85 Environmental
justice can be characterized as a fusing of the
civil rights and environmental movements. The
movement has maintained a concern with the
distributional effects of pollution, and particu-
larly its effects on low income communities
and communities of color. Concerns about
toxic substances and their effect on Latino
communities were a constant element of
Ceasar Chavez’s work with the United Farm
Workers.86 Environmental justice issues were
again brought to prominence by the United
Church of Christ's 1982 involvement in a land-
fill siting conflict in Warren County, North
Carolina.87 The Church's Commission for Racial
Justice studied the associations between racial
and socioeconomic characteristics of commu-
nities that house hazardous waste sites.88 The
study found that poor and black communities
had a greater number of hazardous waste sites
than average.89 Standardizing for income, the
study found race more predictive than income
for the location of high concentrations of haz-
ardous waste sites.90 The study drew criticism
from some,91 and served as a rallying cry for
others. Academics such as Professor Robert
Bullard have led efforts to connect activism
and scholarship in the area.92 Some have pub-
lished work investigating the association
between race, siting, and the probability of
cleanup.93 Organizations have grown up around
this relatively newly developed issue, such as
CBE in California.94 Luke Cole, a practitioner at
the Center for Race, Poverty and the Environment
has described the development of a field of "envi-
ronmental poverty law"95 which draws on an
integration of legal tactics, grassroots organiz-
ing, and working with technical and scientific
information.96 Environmental and civil rights
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81. Deposition testimony of Bruce Lohmann, discussed in
Id. at 3 and attached to Id. as Exhibit "A" (hereinafter “Lohman
Dep.”; Marc Cooper, Smoke Screen, NEW YORK TIMES LOS ANGELES,
Feb. 5-11, 1998, at 9.
82. Lohman Dep., supra note 81, at 4.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. CBE Compl., supra note 7.
86. Comments of the Chairman, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency Office Of Environmental Justice In The Matter Of The Fifth Meeting
Of The National Environmental Justice Advisory Council, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM.
U. 623, 625 (1995) (commenting on the absence of Chavez and
others from the council).
87. COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST,
TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON
THE RACIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH




91. Daniel Kevin, Environmental Racism and Locally Undesirable
Land Uses: A Critique of Environmental Justice Theories and Remedies, 8
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 121 (1997); Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses
in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?,
103 YALE L.J. 1383 (1994).
92. See, e.g., Robert D. Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental
Racism and the Environmental Justice Movement, in CONFRONTING
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS (Robert
Bullard, Ed., 1993).
93. See id; see, e.g., James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, The
Benefits and Costs of Regulatory Reforms for Superfund, 16 STAN ENVTL.
L.J. 159, 180 (1997) (finding that minority communities are less
likely to receive technical assistance grants under Superfund than
other communities); But see studies cited supra note 91.
94. The organization's web site is located at http://
www.cbela.org (last visited Mar. 20, 2000).
95. Luke Cole, Practicing Environmental Policy Law, 19
ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 661 (1998).
96. Luke Cole & Christopher Edley, Comments as
Panelists on Race at the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law
Review Conference on Lawyering in the 21st Century, Harvard
Law School (Mar. 4, 2000).
Legal Defense Fund have joined lawsuits
aimed at achieving environmental justice
goals.97 President Clinton's Executive Order
12898 on Environmental Justice marked an
official voicing of concern over the racial and
poverty-related distributional effects of envi-
ronmental hazards.98 A number of agencies
have responded by creating their own environ-
mental justice programs.99 The EPA in 1993
formed the National Advisory Committee on
Environmental Justice100 under the Federal
Advisory Committee Act.101 It has also estab-
lished a review process for complaints that the
EPA or EPA-funded programs violate the Civil
Rights Act's Title VI prohibition against dis-
crimination by federally funded programs.
As the environmental justice perspective
has developed, environmental permitting and
regulation programs have been attacked for
producing localized "hot spots." These are
areas of concentrated pollutants from single or
multiple sources of emissions that create areas
of high health hazard.102 Environmental justice
concerns are implicated when these hot spots
fall in low-income communities or communi-
ties of color. Some campaigns have used the
EPA administrative process to bring Title VI
based complaints.103 Others have relied on a
mix of political action and conventional
"NIMBY"104 techniques such as complaints
for procedural violation of the National
Environmental Policy Act or analogous state
statutes.105 Some advocates have integrated
racial and ethnic issues into claims grounded
in traditional attacks on agency compliance
with public participation requirements.
Members of the Latino community in
Kettleman City, California successfully chal-
lenged a county permit authorizing the con-
struction of a waste treatment facility.106 The
permit was issued without holding public
forums in Spanish or considering comments
written in Spanish.107
Other campaigns have attempted to craft
legal tools focused on race and disparate
impact. The highest profile example of this has
been an attack on permitting for treatment,
storage, and disposal facilities in Chester
County, Pennsylvania. In Chester Residents v. Seif,
a coalition of community members and
activists sued the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection for consistently
granting permits to facilities located in a pre-
dominantly low-income and black urban area
of a majority white county.108 The plaintiffs
noted that the county in question had a num-
ber of treatment, storage, and disposal facili-
ties for solid and hazardous waste, all of which
were located in this small urban region.109 They
argued that the EPA's regulations promulgated
pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act pro-
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97. Id.; Complaint and Memorandum of Points and
Authorities for Relief from Environmental Justice Violations, CBE
v. SCAQMD (Title VI Complaint before EPA) 26 (document signed
by representatives of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund,
Communities for a Better Environment, and the Center on Race,
Poverty and the Environment).
98. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11,
1994).
99. See Interagency Working Group on Environmental
Justice; Notification of Availability of Federal Agency
Environmental Justice Strategies for Comment, 60 Fed. Reg. 6710
(Feb. 3, 1995) and 30,871 (June 12, 1995) (discussing environ-
mental justice strategies of various federal agencies.); In the Matter
of Louisiana Energy Services, 1998 N.R.C. Lexis 7, 13 (1998) (dis-
cussing NRC environmental justice strategy).
100. For more information see the agency's
Environmental Justice web site at <http://es.epa.gov/oeca/
main/ej/nejac/index.html> (last visited Mar. 13, 2000).
101. 5 U.S.C. § 9(c) (current committee charter filed with
Congress Sept. 28, 1999).
102. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 44301(d) (Deering 2001).
103. See, e.g., CBE Compl., supra note 7.
104. NIMBY (Not in my Back Yard) tactics are those proce-
dural and substantive legal and political approaches that have
been generally employed by concerned residents to delay and
prevent land development or environmental permitting proceed-
ings.
105. Cole, supra note 95, at 674 (discussing the Kettleman
City TSDF campaign and litigation).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 944 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Pa.1996). Some of the success
of the environmental justice movement is in changing the face of
the environmental movement, and in encouraging a "lawyers on
tap" instead of a "lawyers on top" view of the world. There have
been some exceptions where community members have been
highly involved in the prosecution of citizen suits. For example,
Citizens for a Better Environment v. Chrome Crankshaft,
VC028531 (Los Angeles County Superior Ct., Cal. 1998) has had
substantial community involvement and support; California
Environmental Group Sues for Water Contamination at School, MEALEY’S
EMERGING TOXIC TORTS, (Feb. 19, 1999); California: Neighbors Sue
Chrome Plating Shop Over Water Contamination, Cancer, BNA STATE
ENVTL. DAILY, Feb. 2, 1999, at D3.
109. Chester Residents v, Seif, 944 F. Supp. 413 (Pa. D. 1996).
programs gave them a private cause of action
for the discriminatory effect of the state's
actions.110 While this view was upheld by the
Third Circuit in Chester Residents v. Seif,111 the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.112 After plans
to build the challenged facility were canceled
and the case thereby rendered moot, the Court
vacated the 3rd Circuit's decision.113 The
Court's action in vacating the decision calls
into question the viability of Title VI disparate
impact claims. The Third Circuit's holding in
Chester Residents relied heavily on the Supreme
Court's holding in Guardians Association v. Civil
Service Commission114 that regulations promulgat-
ed pursuant to Title VI prohibiting actions with
a disparate impact creates a cause of action for
private individuals suing for disparate
impact.115 The narrow holding in Guardians was
the product of a majority which is no longer on
the Court,116 making unlikely an expansion of
the Guardians holding into a right to sue in the
environmental context for environmental jus-
tice related claims.
The limited viability of Title VI as a litiga-
tion tool suggests the need for other doctrinal
hooks for the environmental justice advocate.
IV. A Different Approach — Market
Blindness.
The current emission reduction credit trad-
ing system commodifies emissions, measured
in amounts of substance emitted into the air
basin. Underlying this commodification is an
assumption that emissions are fungible — that
a pound of VOCs emitted in, for example, a
heavily populated mixed-use neighborhood, is
the same as a pound of VOCs emitted in an
industrial park away from a residential popula-
tion. This view is not entirely irrational. VOCs
play an important role in the production of
ozone, and as a catalyst for the chemical reac-
tions that lead to the creation of photochemi-
cal smog in the troposphere.117 Limiting the
aggregate amount of VOCs released in an air
basin is important to any attempt to control
this process. If the only outcome of interest for
VOCs is their role in ozone and photochemical
smog production, a market need not look fur-
ther than aggregate emissions. This focus on
aggregate emissions was an underlying
assumption of the EPA's 1996 emissions trad-
ing policy statement.118
But many VOCs do cause localized health
effects — carcinogenic and non-carcinogenic
— in communities that surround sources of
emissions.119 Some, like Benzene, are known
human carcinogens.120 Others, like Toluene, are
not classified as carcinogens, but have the
potential to cause neurological and other non-
cancer injuries and illness.121 Aggregate emis-
sions are but one of a number of potential
bases for establishing a market, or for testing a














111. 132 F.3d 925 (1997).
112. Seif v. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, 524
U.S. 914 (1998).
113. Seif v. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, 524
U.S. 974 (1998).
114. Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n Of The City Of N.Y.,
463 U.S. 582 (1983).
115. Chester Residents v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (1997).
116. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584, n.2 (1983). Justice White,
noted, "I conclude, as do four other Justices, in separate opin-
ions, that the Court of Appeals erred in requiring proof of dis-
criminatory intent." Id. at 584. The Justice commented that "[t]he
five of us reach the conclusion that the Court of Appeals erred by
different routes. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan and
Justice Blackmun, reasons that, although Title VI itself requires
proof of discriminatory intent, the administrative regulations
incorporating a disparate impact standard are valid.  Justice
Marshall would hold that, under Title VI itself, proof of disparate
impact discrimination is all that is necessary.  I agree with Justice
Marshall that discriminatory animus is not an essential element
of a violation of Title VI. I also believe that the regulations are
valid, even assuming arguendo that Title VI, in and of itself, does
not proscribe disparate impact discrimination." Id. at n.2.
117. Daniel L. Costa & Mary O. Amdur, Air Pollution, in
CASARETT AND DOULL’S TOXICOLOGY, 5th Ed. (1996) 857, 860; Id. at
873.
118. U.S. EPA, Emissions Trading Policy Statement;
General Principles for Creation, Banking and Use of Emission
Reduction Credits, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814 (Dec. 4 1986), discussed at
U.S. EPA, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants for Source Categories; Organic Hazardous Air
Pollutants from the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturing
Industry and Seven Other Processes, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,608, 62,683
(Dec. 31, 1992).
119. Compare EPA Integrated Risk Information System
(IRIS) document for Benzene (CASRN 71-43-2, updated Jan. 19,
2000) §II.A.1 (Benzene a "Class A" or known human carcinogen)
with IRIS Document for Toluene (CASRN 108-88-3, updated
4/1/94) §II.A.1 (Tuolene "Class D" or non classified as a carcinogen).
120. IRIS Document for Benzene, supra note 119.
121. IRIS Document for Tuolene, supra note 119.
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outcomes. In analyzing these localized trades,
a key outcome of interest from a public health
or population perspective is total disease bur-
den.122 In other words, if a trade is allowed, will
the net result be a greater risk of illness and
injury?  A simple criteria for measuring the
"efficiency" of a trade is whether it makes the
effects of pollution worse. Under this view, a
trade on the margin of a trading system that
increases morbidity and mortality over that
without the trade is not efficient.
A trading system that commodifies tons of
emissions may fail this test. Where the market
trades in tons of contaminant coming out of
the proverbial smokestack rather than the
effect of that contaminant on the community,
the market may be blind to the real health
effects of the system.This paper does not pro-
pose a trading market for "rights" to produce
chronic disorders and cancers in receptor pop-
ulations.123 But when theoretically applied,
such a model is a useful benchmark to test the
performance of our current system in avoiding
trades that increase burdens to health. In con-
trast to the customary net emissions market,
this health effects market focuses not on aggre-
gate emissions at the smokestack, but rather
on the effects of those emissions on the recep-
tor population.
To develop such a hypothetical market,
there must be a means to assess the health
effects of the emissions being traded. Public
health provides the tools to examine the
health effects of exposures on populations.
Two tools of public health analysis — risk
assessment and toxicology — are useful in
developing this theoretical model. Modeling
the effects of a substance on a human popula-
tion is made easier by the application of a con-
ceptual tool — the "Source to Target
Paradigm."124 A tool of environmental health
practice, the paradigm focuses on the causal
pathway from emissions to individual expo-
sures and then to resultant health effects in
those individuals.125 This target-focused view
evaluates the impact of an action by its effect
on the target individual or population's health.
Its goal is to describe those actions that cause
illness or injury or increase the risk of injury
above baseline.126
These techniques may be illustrated
though the example of a hypothetical industri-
al process emitting VOCs. The substances dis-
perse by wind and diffusion across the sur-
rounding area. If the area is inhabited, resi-
dents of the area would be exposed to the sub-
stances in question. Atmospheric models
could predict the amount of substances reach-
ing the receptor population.127
Toxicological assessments provide a model
of how the receptor population will, on aver-
age, respond to the exposures.128 This assess-
ment relies on information relating to the iden-
tity and properties of the substance, the
amount released, and the environmental fate
and transport of the substance — what hap-
pens to it in the environment.129 This data along
with an understanding of how rapidly the
human body absorbs chemicals goes into esti-
mating the biological dose to the population
exposed.130 Toxicological dose-response data
can then be applied to estimate the risk of dis-
ease to the population in question. These con-
siderations of localized human health effects
from particular exposures are absent from the
traditional emissions credit trading system.
V. Critiquing Fungibility from a Health
Perspective
A. The Method — Toxicology and Risk
Assessment
Toxicology and Risk Assessment can be













122. See, e.g., Frank Speizer, Occupational and Environmental
Lung Diseases: An Overview, ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. (Aug. 2000); Global
Disease Elimination and Eradication as Public Health Strategies, MORBIDITY
AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, Dec. 31, 1999, at 6.
123. Such a trading system might be even more problem-
atic than the current formulation of emission credit trading under
Dr. Sandel's approach. See supra note 63.
124. DADE W. MOELLER, ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 40 (1997)
(illustrating the pathway approach to hazard evaluation).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., id. at 39.
128. Id. at 30; David L. Eaton & Curtis D., Principles of
Toxicology, CASARETT & DOULL’S TOXICOLOGY, (1996) at 18.
129. MOELLER, supra note 124 at 39.
130. Id.
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impacts of the prior and proposed use of the
emissions credit and thereby to assess its net
effect on the human health of local communities.
Risk assessment can be conceived of as a
three-part process.131 First, a hazard is identi-
fied. Then, data on the health effects of expo-
sure is analyzed to describe the level of risk
posed to an exposed person or population at
various levels of exposure. The population or
individuals of interest are then studied to esti-
mate the actual exposure of those individuals
to the substance in question.
To paraphrase the early physician and tox-
icologist Paracleus, the poison is in the dose.132
This states a conceptually simple proposition
that can be difficult to model with useful preci-
sion. The effect of exposure to a substance is
linked to the dose. Toxicology attempts to
describe the general relationship between
dose and response and to characterize the risk
posed to those individuals by the exposure in
question.133
These models are by their nature imperfect,
but they provide a useful best estimate of the
action of toxins on the human body. The EPA and
National Academy of Sciences have recently
commented on the deficiencies in the state of the
art of toxicological risk modeling for cancer
effects.134 While offering aspirational goals for the
field, their conclusions leave substantially
unchanged the current methodology pending the
development of additional tools of analysis.135
The goal of cancer and non-cancer health
effects models is to establish a dose-response
relationship — ascertaining the health effects
associated with various biological doses of the
substances in question.136 Usually, the relation-
ship is represented as a line on a graph with
dose and response on the x and y axes ("dose-
response curve").137 The curve is often assumed
to have a constant slope138 (the "linearity
assumption") and thus is often expressed as a
rather simple linear equation. The effects of
other substances may require more complex
equation modelings.
Models of cancer health effects use risk of
cancer as their measure of response.139 EPA
models rely on a no-threshold assumption.140
Working from the thesis that cancers can begin
with a single mutation, the no-threshold
approach assumes that there is no dose of a
carcinogen that poses no risk of cancer.141 This
means that a graphed carcinogenic dose-
response curve would pass through the graph's
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131. For a general discussion of risk assessment see gener-
ally Elaine M. Faustman & Gilbert S. Omenn, Risk Assessment,
CASSARETT & DOULL’S TOXICOLOGY, 5th Ed. (1996) 75.
132. Phillipus Aureolus Theophrastus Bombastus
VonHoenheif, quoted in, CASSARETT & DOULL’S TOXICOLOGY, 5th Ed.
(1996), i. ("Solely the dose determines that a thing is not a poison").
133. Virginia Steward Houk & Michael D. Waters, Genetic
Toxicity of Complex Mixtures, TOXICOLOGY & RISK ASSESSMENT PRINCIPLES,
METHODS & APPLICATIONS, 370 (Anna M. Fan & Couis W. Chang,
Eds., 1996).; See also Welford C. Roberts & Charles O. Abernathy,
Basic Elements and Approaches in Risk Assessment, TOXICOLOGY & RISK
ASSESSMENT PRINCIPLES, METHODS & APPLICATIONS, 245, 250 (Anna M.
Fan & Louis W. Chang, Eds., 1996).
134. See Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk
Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,960 (April 23, 1996).
135. Id.
136. MOELLER, supra note 124 at 14.
137. Eaton & Klassen, supra note 169 at 19-23; MOELLER,
supra note 124 at 21.
138. The FDA, for example, uses a "nonthreshold, linear-
at-low-dose extrapolation procedure that determines the upper
level of risk." This Gaylor-Kodell model set forth in 50 Fed. Reg.
45,530-45,556 (1985) is discussed in Appendix 2 to William
Hallenbeck, QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH, 157 (1993), and generally means that from
the lowest data point, you draw a straight line to the origin (0,0).
139. MOELLER, supra note 124 at 21.
140. Generally, cancer causing agents are treated as zero-
threshold substances — the assumption is made that no level of
chemical exposure is without risk and thereby "safe", but that any expo-
sure poses some risk. Roberts & Abernathy, supra note 133 at 218, 263 .
141. Id. at 226 (noting that the basis for this assumption is
the presumed method of carcinogenesis - that the smallest com-
ponent of a carcinogen could cause a cancer-inducing mutation -
and that higher concentrations only increase the probability of an
interaction with DNA that could cause such a mutation).  But see
Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed.
Reg. 17,960 (Apr. 23, 1996) (suggesting that as knowledge about
the mechanisms of carcinogenesis develops this zero-threshold
assumption may need to be refined).
The zero-threshold assumption for risk has focused regula-
tors on limiting risk to acceptable levels, as California’s
Proposition 65 did at 1x10-5.  See Brian K. Davis & A.K. Klein,
Medium-Specific and Multimedia Risk Assessment, TOXICOLOGY & RISK
ASSESSMENT PRINCIPLES, METHODS & APPLICATIONS 290 (Anna M. Fan
& Louis W. Chang, Eds., 1996).
142. WILLIAM HALLENBECK, QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH 157 (1993) (appendix 2).
A cancer dose-response143 curve such as
that discussed above can be used to estimate
the risk of cancer from a particular biological
dose.144 Exposure modeling allows the estima-
tion of actual biological dose from an environ-
mental concentration. In other words, it allows
the estimation of the amount of a substance in
air, food, or water that is actually taken in by
and able to act on the body. If the exposure is
from a gas or other airborne substance, math-
ematical models can estimate total exposure
from the volume of air inhaled, the rate of
absorption through lung tissue and skin area,
and other such factors.145 A composite model
can then approximate the individual's
increased risk of cancer attributable to that
exposure.146 Spatial analysis of population and
emissions through a computerized geographic
information system ("GIS") allows estimates of
individual expopsure. Fundamentally, a GIS sys-
tem allows the study of data that includes infor-
mation on geographic location. Population and
ground-level exposure data can be related geo-
graphically to estimate the population exposed
to an emission and their level of exposure.147
Estimates of risk from exposure can in turn
estimate the population’s cancer risk attributa-
ble to the exposure(s). GIS-based demographic
analysis of communities surrounding permit
applicants, including race and population den-
sity, is a key step in the EPA's methodology for
testing for disparate impact under Title VI.148
The non-cancer health effects of a sub-
stance can also be described through dose-
response curves. Initially, the curve is based on
identifying a "no observed adverse effects
level" ("NOAEL"): a dosage where the investi-
gator is unable to identify any adverse effects
on the subject.149 A "no observed effects level"
("NOEL") and associated reference dose
(“RfD”) is derived from the NOAEL to deter-
mine an acceptable level of exposure, which
includes an adequate margin of safety.150 A
"Hazard Index" of one ("HI=1") exists where the
dose to an individual is equal to the RfD.
Conceptually, a hazard index of one
denotes an exposure at the highest level where
there has been no observed effect on biological
processes.151 A hazard index greater than one
reflects exposure at a multiple of the RfD.  As
an example, a dose at five times of the NOEL
would produce a HI of five. While some sub-
stances have no measurable threshold as
regards chronic non-carcinogenic health
effects, most have a threshold. In such a case,
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143. National Academy of Sciences  (1983) defines dose-
response assessment as "The process of characterizing the rela-
tionship between the dose of an agent administered or received
and the incidence of an adverse health effect in exposed popula-
tions and estimating the incidence as a function of human expo-
sure to the agent." Roberts & Abernathy, supra note 140 at 254.
144. For a discussion of NOAEL, LOAEL, RfD see Roberts &
Abernathy, supra note 140, at 256.
145. MOELLER, supra note 124 at 15.
146. But see discussion of synergistic and antagonistic
interactions between substances, infra § V(A).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 180-185 for an
illustration; Also OCR Methodologies, infra note 148.
148. The USEPA Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") methodolo-
gy includes:
"Step 2: Determining the Demographics of
the Affected Population
The second step is to determine the racial
and/or ethnic composition of the affected
population for the permitted facility at
issue in the complaint. To do so, OCR uses
demographic mapping technology, such as
Geographic Information Systems (GIS). In con-
ducting a typical analysis to determine the affected
population, OCR generates data estimating the
race and/or ethnicity and density of populations
within a certain proximity from a facility or within
the distribution pattern for a release/impact based
on scientific models. OCR then identifies and
characterizes the affected population for
the facility at issue. If the affected popula-
tion for the permit at issue is of the alleged
racial or ethnic group(s) named in the com-
plaint, then the demographic analysis is
repeated for each facility in the chosen uni-
verse(s) of facilities discussed below."
U.S. E.P.A., INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR INVESTIGATING TITLE VI
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS CHALLENGING PERMITS (1998) 10
<http://es.epa.gov/oeca/oej/titlevi.html> (emphasis added).
149. Faustman & Omenn, supra note 131.
150. Id.
151. SCAQMD R.1401(c)(7); Davis & Klein, supra note 141
at 282-85.
have any known biological effect, or at least, no
observed biological effect.152 The NOEL can be
disaggregated into a set of partial NOEL's for
various organ systems — i.e. neurological,
renal, etc. — to show the level of zero effect for
various systems.153 The substance NOEL is set
at the partial NOEL for which there is the low-
est threshold of effect.
Just as the carcinogenic dose-response
relationship may be extrapolated from to
derive an airborne concentration-response
relationship for a respiratory exposure path-
way, the Reference Dose ("RfD"), or dose equal
to the NOEL, can be extrapolated from to esti-
mate the airborne environmental concentra-
tion that will deliver the RfD to a person
breathing that air.154 This measure is the
Reference Concentration ("RfC"), and it allows
HI calculations to be made based on environ-
mental exposure.155 It should be noted that
each level of abstraction adds uncertainty to
these calculations.156
Generally, cancer risk or HI assessments
are assessments based on the reference con-
centrations for a variety of organ systems
affected by the substance. Cancer risk esti-
mates are produced by a summing of the
effects on a variety of organ systems.157 In con-
trast, RfD is set with reference to the lowest
level that will trigger any biological response in
any organ system.158 Determining the health
effects of multiple chemical exposures is more
complex, but the modeling techniques applied
to the problem have produced a rough but
workable solution.159 Where substances have
non-cancer effects on the same organ systems
— for example, the nervous system — the sub-
stance-attributable hazard indices may be
combined through addition.160 Some chemicals
interact in more complex ways. Some interact
synergistically — producing a greater effect
than would be expected from the two expo-
sures were their effects added. A classic exam-
ple of this is the devastating synergistic effect
of combining smoking and asbestos expo-
sure.161 Other substances in combination can
interact antagonistically. In other words, they
have a subtractive effect, resulting in less bio-
logical effect than if taken individually.162 Non-
additive interactions are in general poorly
studied, and additive models are usually
applied to combining risks.
Modeling non-cancer effects is less
straightforward.  Any exposure to a carcinogen
is assumed to pose a risk of cancer.163 The risk
increases as the level of exposure increases.
Non-cancer effects may require exposure to a
threshold level of a substance.164 These effects
are not generally expressed as risks of one out-
come, like cancer, associated with particular
exposure levels. Instead, they are expressed as
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152. Some studies have suggested that the current
NAAQS are inadequate, as some chronic conditions may be
caused or exacerbated by exposure below the standards. See, e.g.,
Costa & Amdur, Air Pollution, supra note 117; Schwartz, et al.,
Harvesting and Long Term Exposure Effects in the Relations Between Air
Pollution and Mortality, AM. J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY (Mar. 1, 2000).  Some
commentators have noted the general inadequacies in toxicolog-
ical data regarding toxicants.  See MOELLER, supra note 124, at 30.
See also <www.chemicalindustryarchives.com.> (noting the inade-
quate communication of existing data).
153. Faustman & Omenn, supra note 131.
154. The concept of a RfC is a relatively recent approach to
modeling the effects of inhaled substances. See Roberts &
Abernathy, supra note 140 at 262.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Faustman & Omenn, supra note 131 at 81.
158. Id.
159. If individuals are exposed to different compounds then
an additive model is applied if it is assumed that the substances
have the same mode of action and act on the same target organ.
Davis & Klein, supra note 141 at 286 (noting that regulatory agen-
cies generally add risks from all carcinogens because the agents'
underlying means of action are poorly understood).
160. Id.
161. Henry C. Pitot III & Yvonne P. Dragan, Chemical
Carcinogenesis, CURTIS KLAASEN, ED., CASSARETT & DOULL’S TOXICOLOGY
201, 244 (5th Ed. 1996).
162. Subtractive effect can be conceived of through analo-
gy to the interaction of a poison and its antidote. Where risks are
non-additive, a ratio of joint effect (S) for any substances A and B
comparing their interaction can be produced through the follow-
ing method:
where R11 = risk with exposure to A and B, R00 = risk with
exposure to neither A nor B, R10 = risk posed by exposure to A
alone, and R01 = risk posed by exposure to B alone.
163. Roberts & Abernathy, supra note 133 at 226.








exposure that produce a range of effects.165
Exposure effects can range from upper respira-
tory irritation to breathing difficulties, chemi-
cal intoxication, neuro-toxicity and death.166
The existence of sub-threshold exposures
that do not cause health effects, and the broad
range of those health effects, make it more diffi-
cult to apply a no-harm requirement for trades
involving non-carcinogenic rather than carcino-
genic health effects.  Of these two issues, the
former is less problematic.  Where a trade
involves the migration of emissions that will
cause or contribute to a HI greater than or equal
to one, the trade results in a net increase in
health burden if the previous use of the credits
was in a sub-threshold area or if a smaller pop-
ulation was exposed to a threshold level of
exposure.  Exposure-related health effects more
serious than those at the NOAEL are triggered
when exposure levels reach the RfD.167 These can
be expressed as a multiple of the RfD, and thus
as a particular HI>1.168 But the numerical
expression of these effects as a hazard index
would not necessarily make the HI over 1.0 a lin-
ear, appropriate, or even useful way to equate
the health effects associated with exposure to
two different substances. An accurate assess-
ment of comparative disease burden of two
exposures where each HI>1, would require
assessing and comparing the health effects of
each exposure for which a LOAEL has been
reached, and the size of the population impact-
ed.169 These inter-disease comparisons are diffi-
cult in the same way comparisons between can-
cer and noncancer health effects are. They rely
heavily on aggregating personal beliefs about
whether one illness or injury is worse than
another, and upon underdeveloped understand-
ings of the various health effects of toxicants at
exposure levels greater than a HI of 1.170 The dif-
ficulty in establishing a common numerical cur-
rency of analysis may call for a more descriptive
and discretionary balancing based upon com-
mon social beliefs about the risk trade-off
involved, supported by scientific and medical
information about the effects of the substances
in question.
But a rudimentary model for determining if
trades increase localized health effects is
achievable. Absent a standard for comparing
health effects at above HI=1 exposure levels, a
test could apply a simplified comparison of
exposure hazard indices for exposures where
HI>1.171 Combined with a prohibition on trades
that increase exposure over threshold where the
prior use of the credit was sub-threshold, this
analysis would offer an imperfect but adminis-
trable system. The analysis would also be a sub-
stantial improvement over present emissions
credit trading schemes that lack internal checks
on trades that increase health burden.
The models usually applied to estimate
both cancer and noncancer human health risk
from airborne and other exposures of environ-
mental toxicants have become more readily
available and user-accessible given the advent
of widely available computer software and inter-
net distribution.172 Again, applying these models
involves using a very limited understanding of
the effects of toxic substances provided by sci-
entific research in order to try to block trades
that increase risks to human health.  The quali-
ty of the decisions made will improve as model-
ing techniques improve.  But they remain prefer-
able to conventional markets, which ignore
local health effects. These methods allow us to
take a first step into systematic analysis of the
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165. Id. at 80.
166. See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH, POCKET GUIDE TO CHEMICAL HAZARDS, 1994 (DHHS Pub.
No. 94-116).
167. Faustman & Omenn, supra note 131 at 80.
168. Davis & Klein, supra note 141 at 282-85.
169. David L. Eaton & Curtis D. Klassen, Principles of
Toxicology, in Casarett & Doull’s Toxicology (1996) at 16-17; Roberts
& Abernathy, supra note 133 at 226.
170. See supra text accompanying note 251 (relating to
QUALY and DALY concepts).
171. See, e.g., SCAQMD R. 1402.
172. See, e.g., California Department of Toxic Substance
Control Lead Spread spreadsheet for Excel, California
Department of Toxic Substance Control CalTOX spreadsheet, and
EPA SCREEN III aerial dispersion modeling software. The EPA
has developed CAMEO — an integrated suite of dispersion mod-
eling, exposure assessment, and mapping software for emer-
gency response and planning. <http://www.epa.gov/ceppo
/cameo/> (last visited Apr. 15, 2000).
B. Increased Cancer Morbidity and
Mortality Resulting from "Efficient"
Trades in Current "Aggregate
Emissions" Markets.
1. Excess Cancer Burden Based on
Exposure — the Impact of
Population Density
Population disease burden is the aggrega-
tion of the disease burden of each individual in
a population.173 If one exposes a community of
one million to a chemical hazard posing a one
in a million risk of death, it is expected that
one death will result. If the exposed population
doubles, the expected number of deaths would
also double.  Here, using the source to target
paradigm discussed earlier, the size of the pop-
ulation exposed changes the expected cost of
emissions in human lives.  Conceptually, there
is nothing unique about the idea that the pop-
ulation affected by something matters in deter-
mining the total effect.  Environmental Impact
Statement/Review ("EIS/R") processes routine-
ly incorporate data on the size of human popu-
lations.174
In the case of airborne emissions, the mod-
els described previously in the discussion of
risk assessment and toxicology can approxi-
mate the distribution of the substances into
the air surrounding a facility. Uncertainties in
modeling are reduced by the availability in
some areas of detailed micro-meteorological
data.175 To summarize, in the case of airborne
contaminants, an increase in population living
within an area impacted by an emission that
can cause adverse health effects will increase
the total amount of morbidity and mortality
within that population.
a. A Hypothetical Application:
This principle applies most directly to
trades of carcinogens.  Assume a hypothetical
firm — SOURCECO — that has reduced its
emissions of a carcinogenic VOC — "sub-
stance" — by one ton more than that required
by command and control regulations.176
SOURCECO sells this one ton of emissions of
substance to a second firm — USERCO — that
finds it less expensive to purchase SOURCECO's
one ton reduction than to reduce its own emis-
sions of VOCs by a ton.
Under conventional emissions trading
markets are concerned, this is an efficient
transaction.  The commodity sold is a ton of
emitted substance. The total cost of complying
with the aggregate emissions reduction is
reduced with no perceived negative impact on
the environment. But this failure to perceive is
a function of the system's blindness to local
health effects — not of their benign nature or
insignificance. The market as described is blind
to the local health and environmental effects of
the substance in question. If the substance is
carcinogenic and as the cancer risk posed by
VOCs is primarily localized about the source of
emissions, the characteristics of the local com-
munity will determine the real health risk
posed by these exposures.
Returning to the hypothetical, assume that
SOURCECO is a machine shop located in a
mixed-use densely populated community. Also
assume that USERCO is an industrial facility in
a primarily industrial area with little residential
population.177 The trade of one ton of sub-
stance to USERCO causes a net reduction in
health risk. Conversely, if USERCO's emission
of the one ton exposed a larger population
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173. See Speizer, supra note 122.
174. See, e.g., Environmental Impact Statement and
Environmental Impact Report for Continued Operation of
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National
Laboratories, Livermore (DOE/EIS-0157) (1992) at  § 4.3 .
175. See, e.g., Decl. of Schulyer Beth Fishman in Opp. to
Deft's. Mot. to Dismiss, Communities for a Better Environment v.
Chevron, CV# 97-5412DT (BQRx), (C.D. Cal. 1998) (for an applica-
tion of such data).
176. In this context, "command and control" refers to
those regulations that place an absolute cap on emissions at a
particular plant or from a particular process without allowing
flexibility to shift pollution rights (or reduction responsibility)
among various polluters.
177. The real health effects of toxic substance use fall heav-
ily on the backs of workers in facilities using the substances. The
focus of this analysis, and of the markets analyzed, is limited to
EPA-regulated sources rather than taking a more holistic view
because of the segregation of responsibility for occupational toxi-
cs exposure into the state workers compensation and state/federal
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) systems.
The OSHA Act is set forth at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-667. It is a fair critique
that approaches designed to reduce the effects of pollution,
including models of the effects of emissions trades, ought to
include estimates of the burden of occupational injury and illness.
cause an increase in morbidity and mortality. If
the buyer and seller of emissions engaged in a
transaction produce emissions of the same
substances which cover a geographic area
about the plants of roughly the same radius,
the number of people in that radius — the
population density — provides a very rough
but conceptually useful standard of comparing
the impact of their emissions.
b. Analysis of VOC Trades in
One Air Quality District
The hypothetical above illustrates the
potential for an "inefficient" trade, but leaves
unresolved the question of whether trades like
this occur. Comparison of the population living
within small radii of source and user facilities
would provide a useful, albeit imprecise
answer to this question. Analysis of one air dis-
trict's VOC ERC trading program answers the
question in the affirmative.
A number of regulatory agencies operate
substantial VOC emission credit trading sys-
tems.178 The performance of a system might be
evaluated for its ability to block trades that
increase health burden. Such an evaluation
might be based on district-provided data on
the geographic location of the source and user
of the credits traded, and the quantity and type
of material traded. By integrating census tract
population data with the geographic location
of trades in a geographic information system,
the population densities of areas surrounding
sources and users of credits may be compared.
Using historical trading data provided by San
Francisco's Bay Area Air Quality Management
District ("BAAQMD"),179 an analysis was con-
ducted to describe the population densities of
source and user communities.
In 1999 there were 83 active VOC emission
credit trades between facilities within
California's Bay Area Air Quality Management
District. The data provided by the district
included the geographic location of the
sources and users of ERCs.180 Using ArcView
GIS software, the geographic location of the
source and receptor sites was plotted and pop-
ulation density calculated.181 Census tract
boundary and population data was imported
into ArcView,182 enabling the gathering of popu-
lation and area data for all census tracts with-
in one half and two mile radii of the sources
and receptors.183 The raw population data was
converted into density data by dividing it by
the area of the census tracts wholly or partially
enclosed within the radius of interest of the
site in question.184 This in turn accomplished a
standardization by area, as the radii from
sources and users enclosed census tracts of
varying sizes and shapes. The importation of
the data into STATA facilitated data analysis.185
The data analysis had two functions. The
first function was to describe the overall differ-
ences in population density between aggregat-
ed source and user communities.  The second
function was to describe the quantity and mag-
nitude of any trades that moved VOCs to com-
munities with higher population densities.
In the aggregate, communities within a half-
mile radius of BAAQMD sources are 3.81 times
more densely populated than its similarly













Spring 2001 New Tools for Environmental Justice
178. See supra text accompanying notes 40-46.
179. BAAQMD was cooperative in aiding this analysis by
providing data on the location of trades and amount traded. The
dataset from their district is the only set used because of their
ability and willingness to produce a large set of paired location
data. Other districts were unable or unwilling to provide such data.
180. The data in question was mapped on a NAD72 datum
UTM protection. UTM or Universal Transverse Mercator is a grid
system used to express the longitude and latitude of a specific
point on the earth, and employs a series of regions of the earth
with grid overlays based on their own datum points.
181. Societal disease burden is heavily affected by occu-
pational exposure — as occupational exposures are likely to be
much higher than community exposures. Supra note 177.
182. ArcView 3.1 GIS Software, (c) 1992-1998 by
Environmental System Research Inc., licensed to the Harvard
University Library Map Collection. Available at
<http://www.esri.com> (last visited Jan. 14, 2000).
183. This is an original study completed for the purposes
of this paper. Inter-facility emission reduction credit data provid-
ed by the BAAQMD was mapped using a 1972 datum UTM Area
projection in ArcView, and population density in census tracts
within 0.5 and 2 mile radii of the UTM coordinates provided by
BAAQMD for credit source and receiver calculated using 1999 US
Census estimated population, as well as persons older than 65
and younger than 18. After standardization for the differing area
of the tracts by converting from population counts to densities,
the results were compared and tabulated using the STATA statis-
tical analysis program. 
184. For a discussion of methodology see supra note 183.
185. STATA software package, v. 5.0 for Win. 95, produced
by STATA Corporation, at <http://www.stata.com>.
infra, this difference is statistically significant.186
A number of the trades in the market were
made between pairs of trading partners who
engaged in multiple transactions.  In a second
analysis, repeat trades by the same partners
were combined.187 One summary record was
generated to take the place of each set of
trades. As is reflected in Table 1, the direction
of the difference between communities with
high and low densities holds, but the magni-
tude of the difference is significantly reduced.
Source communities have roughly 2.09 times
the population density of user communities.
Table 1 — Density (total population)
per Square Kilometer.
Note: For both pairs of user and source data, one-
sided t test α<0.05)
While the BAAQMD's trading system does
not in the aggregate appear to have caused a
mass movement of credits from less densely to
more densely populated communities, this
aggregate perspective is insensitive to the
quantity and magnitude of individual trades
that have resulted in movement of emissions
to more densely populated areas. In STATA,
data from the 83 transactions was analyzed to
generate a count and description of those
trades. These results are presented in Table 2.
This data shows that trades accounting for
98.4 tons of VOC move pollutants to users
surrounded in a ½ mile radius by more dense-
ly populated areas than those around the
source. Among trades from lower to higher
density communities, the user communities at
a ½ mile radius were on average 8.7 times more
densely populated than the sources. The mag-
nitude of the size of trades decreases when
communities in a 2.0-mile radius are com-
pared. While in this air district these trades
only constitute roughly 15% of total trades, this
number is unstable when the trades between
two partners are aggregated. In that case, while
the number of trades to more highly populated
areas remains constant, they account for
roughly 42% of all trades. Density is a very
rough estimate of health risk and the methods
used to calculate density in this example were
imprecise. This data suggests that there are
trades taking place, even in what is perhaps
one of the districts most highly attuned to this
issue, where in the guise of an "efficient" pro-
gram emissions are being moved to areas
where they may be resulting in the exposure of
larger numbers of people and thereby increas-
ing the total risk and burden to human
health.189
Table 2 — Distribution of trades to 
higher density communities.
c. Two Cases — When
Environmental Justice and
Health Burden Coincide
Two recent cases show that opportunities
exist to apply the health risk analysis approach
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186. α<0.05.
187. This aggregation reduced the BIAs in trade counts
toward trading partners who engaged in repreated trades
between the same facilities.
188. While this emissions model provides only a very
rough estimate of one element of the health effects of these
trades, this study suggests that some real world emissions trades
allow the migration of credits to areas where they place a larger
population at risk through exposure than had there been no
trade. A lack of speciation data precluded analysis of the health
effects of the type of VOC involved.
189. An analogous paired analytical method was
employed in Vicki Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or
Going to the Barrios? A Longitudinal Analysis Of Environmental Justice
Claims, 24 ECOL. L. Q 1 (1997).
All Trades Grouped trades
source density 1499 1190

















Trades to higher density 12 13 12 13
As % of total 14.5% 15.6% 38.7% 41.9%
Avg. tons of trade 8.2 5.3 8.2 5.3
Max. tons of trade 50.6 50.6 50.6 50.6
Min. tons of trade 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Total tons 98.4 68.9 98.4 68.9
Avg. increase in pop. 8.7x 1.94x 8.7x 1.94x
Max. increase in pop. 39.3x 4.4x 39.3x 4.4x
Los Angeles area oil refineries and marine
terminals190 have made use of emissions cred-
its from air district authorized car scrapping
programs. The refineries have been sued under
the CAA's citizen suit provisions for these
actions,191 and the SCAQMD has been the sub-
ject of complaints before the EPA under Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act.192 CBE and the NAACP
have alleged that SCAQMD violated Title VI by
allowing the migration and concentration of
emissions from the district's car scrapping sys-
tem assumedly draws vehicles from the entire
county, to a small number of refineries and ter-
minals near communities of color.193
The credits at issue were used in lieu of
outfitting the petroleum transfer facilities with
vapor recovery technology to reduce emissions
during loading operations.194 Roughly 660 tons
of VOC emission reductions had been foregone
because of credit use.195 Under a disparate
impact analysis, complainants argued that the
South Coast Air Basin as a whole has only 37%
people of color, but that the San Pedro com-
munity most affected by one refinery is com-
posed of more than 90% people of color.196 The
CBE complaint presents a variety of data on
the communities impacted by these relatively
large trades.
Health-based population density analysis
can act as a proxy for racial disparate impact
analysis where high population density is cor-
related with high minority population.
Population density data on communities with-
in a 1.5 mile radius of the marine terminals is
presented in Table 3, along with estimated
population density based on an assumed 7.06
square miles area within the 1.5 mile radius.
The results in Table 3 show that the commu-
nities in question have both a larger minority
population than average for Los Angeles
County, and a greater population density than
the County's average of 2308 people per square
mile.197 The mobile sources of emission credits
—  scrapped vehicles — come from throughout
the county. CBE alleges that these trades have
produced local concentrations of pollutants,
distributionally unequal toxic "hot spots", in
low-income communities of color.198 The data
in Table 3 suggest that the trades may have, in
addition, caused a movement of pollutants to
more densely populated areas, and thereby
increased the net health burden from air pollu-
tion in Los Angeles County.199
Table 3 — Communities Impacted by
Refinery Emissions at 1.5 Mile Radius.
Note: Totals assume non-overlapping refinery
emission radii.
Elsewhere in the County, Southeast Los
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190. Marine terminals are those facilities used for loading
and offloading of petroleum from oil tankers, and are used in the
Los Angeles area to transfer oil from tankers to area refineries for
processing and distribution.
191. See, e.g., Communities for a Better Env't v. Unocal Corp., No.
97-5414 (C.D. Cal. filed July 23, 1997); Communities for a Better Env't
v. Ultramar Corp., No. 97-5413 (C.D. Cal. filed July 23, 1997);
Communities for a Better Env't v. Chevron Corp., No. 97-5412 (C.D. Cal.
filed July 23, 1997); Communities for a Better Env't v. Tosco Corp., No.
97-5411 (C.D. Cal. filed July 23, 1997); Communities for a Better Env't
v. GATX Capital Corp., No. 97-5410 (C.D. Cal. filed July 23, 1997).
192. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC § 2000d
et seq. EPA's Title VI implementing regulations are located at 40
CFR § 7.35. See Communities for a Better Environment v. South Coast Air
Quality Management District, Complaint And Memorandum Of
Points And Authorities For Relief From Environmental Justice
Violations (July 23, 1997).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. California Group Files Civil Rights Claim Against California
Pollution Transfer Program, BNA STATE ENVIR. DAILY (July 28, 1997).
196. CBE Compl., supra note 7.
197. Id. (population counts are taken from the Complaint.
Extrapolations to density were based on dividing the 1.5 mile
radius population count by the surface area within a 1.5 mile
radius, 7.06 square miles). 
198. Complainants also alleged that the program consti-
tuted intentional discrimination. See CBE Compl., supra note 7 at
23.
199. Some advocates have proposed incentive systems for
old vehicle scrapping which do not employ inter-source (i.e.
vehicular to stationary source) trading. Steven Allan, Begg Targets
Old Bangers to End Pollution, THE SCOTSMAN, March 3, 2000.
(Discussing a trade-in system for old vehicles that compensated
owners with transit passes).
Refinery Population Pop/Mi2 % people of color
1 23,831 3371 89.9
2 17,348 2454 85.9
3 23,956 3389 74.8
total 65,135 3075 -
involved in environmental justice issues.200
Residents of this principally low income Latino
community have organized the LA/CAUSA
organization in coordination with CBE.201 While
LA/CAUSA's activism has not been focused on
emissions trading, the organization's reports
on local concentrations of industry in this
mostly minority community documents a case
where a health effects mode of analysis may be
useful. In making equity arguments about
multi-source exposures, CBE and LA/CAUSA
have described the population density of the
area, as noted in Table 4. 
Table 4 — Population Densitites in
SELA, selected SELA municipalities,
and Los Angeles County Generally.202
CBE reports have made allegations of dis-
parate impact on communities of color in
SELA by focusing on the density of people of
color in the impacted communities.203 But their
reports also include information on general
population density. This data indicates that the
region and in particular certain municipalities
within it have  between 4.4 and 10.5 times the
population density of the county as a whole.204
The correlation between relatively high con-
centrations of low-income minority individuals
and high concentrations of population within
an urban/suburban metropolis seems intu-
itively unsurprising.205 It also provides another
case study for the potential usefulness of a
health-burden based method of analysis in
advancing environmental justice.206
C. Excess Disease Burden Where There
are Sensitive Populations
A more nuanced model of total health
effects would disaggregate the population
impacted by an exposure. Pollutants may have
a more pronounced effect on sensitive popula-
tions, particularly children and the elderly.207
Research is developing on the effects of car-
cinogens on children. Respiratory irritants may
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200. See, e.g., CBE v. Chrome Crankshaft, VCO28531 (Los
Angeles Co. Superior Ct., Cal. 1998)
201. The organization's web site is <http://www.cbela.
org>.
202. COMMUNITIES FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT, HOLDING OUR
BREATH: ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE EXPOSED IN SOUTHEAST LOS ANGELES
17 (1998).
203. Id.
204. See density counts at Table 3.
205. See generally Daniel S. Shah, Lawyering For Empowerment:
Community Development And Social Change, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 217, 225
(1990) ("Suburban municipalities had no obligation to accept
responsibility for inner city deterioration; they refused to build
public housing, and their zoning restrictions excluded high den-
sity, low income housing in suburbs. All this kept cities segregat-
ed by race and income." Quoting Kenneth Jackson, THE CRABGRASS
FRONTEIR, 277-78 (1985).); Compare research relating to southern
rural areas, e.g. Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor,
and Poisoned: Minority Grassroots Environmentalism and the Quest for Eco-
Justice, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 69, 70 (1991) ("[I]n the South, a
sparse concentration of inhabitants is correlated with poverty
which is in turn correlated with race. [']It follows that criteria for
siting hazardous waste facilities which include density of popula-
tion will have the effect of targeting rural black communities that
have high rates of poverty.[']'' Id. (quoting Conner Bailey &
Charles E. Faupel, Environmentalism and Civil Rights in Sumter
County, Alabama, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE MICHIGAN CONFERENCE ON
RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS, 159, 171
(1990)). The emissions trading cases described arise in a major
metropolis. The observations of Bailey and Faupel suggest that
the methods proposed may not be transferable to some more
rural areas.
206. Another example from Southeast Los Angeles shows
how a health-focused view of emissions can help select against
the adverse effects of zoning balkanization. A portion of
Huntington Park, a heavily populated (19,419 pers/sqm) is sur-
rounded by Vernon, a heavily industrialized city with little popu-
lation (16 pers/sqm). Residents of Huntington Park have come to
call this area, plagued by high asthma rates among their children,
"Asthmatown". This zoning mismatch between residential and
industrial is produced by the municipal border running through
the area. An emissions trading market that included considera-
tions of the effects of emissions on the local population would,
like the emissions in question, extend across city lines. Such a
view would both force new sources in densely populated areas to
purchase "more" credits than in a lightly populated area, and
increase the "market value" of credits derived from the communi-
ty in question, encouraging emissions reductions in this as
opposed to less densely populated areas. See
<www.cbela.org/atn.htm>; Scott Collins, Deborah Sullivan,
Emission Impossible?, LA TIMES, Apr. 30, 1995, at 12.
207. See generally Schwartz, et al., Harvesting and Long Term
Exposure Effects in the Relations Between Air Pollution and Mortality, AM.
J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY (Mar. 1, 2000).
Region Density (people/sqm.)





older individuals, particularly those with preex-
isting emphysema or chronic obstructive pul-
monary disorder ("COPD").208 The CAA recog-
nizes these differences in effect. The Act
requires that the EPA set the national ambient
air quality standards with sensitive populations
in mind.209 Presidential orders have also recog-
nized the importance of taking special care to
protect children from environmental hazards.210
To describe impacts on sensitive popula-
tions, the BAAQMD data previously discussed
was re-analyzed. The re-analysis calculated the
density of populations older than 65 and
younger than 18 within the same radii of
sources and users of VOC emission reduction
credits. Data on sensitive populations was also
obtained through plotting GIS source and user
locations against census tract population and
area data.
Table 5 — Density of Sensitive
Populations in Source and User
Communities (Persons per km2).
As in the aggregate total population analy-
sis, sensitive populations were not more heav-
ily impacted by the trading system taken as a
whole. However, the data showed that similar
numbers of trades resulted in the "inefficient"
movement of pollutants from lower to higher
density communities of sensitive populations
as it had in the total population analysis.
These results are set forth in Table 6 and show
a substantial number of trades to areas more
densely populated by sensitive populations.
The sensitive population data maps close-
ly the aggregate population data previously
analyzed. Total population density was predic-
tive of the population density of sensitive pop-
ulations in the areas studied.211
Table 6 — Count of Trades Moving
Credits to Communities More Heavily
Populated by Sensitive Populations.
D. Excess Disease Burden Based on
Speciation
Air pollutants are not monolithic. Different
chemicals act on the human body in a variety of
ways and with widely varying degrees of poten-
cy.212 VOCs are all carbon-based substances that
tend to evaporate.213 But different types — or
species — of VOCs may act in very different
ways on the human body.214 VOCs tend to be
lumped as a single commodity in trading sys-
tems, and are traded as a group rather than as
amounts of individual substances.215 This makes
these systems blind to  differences in VOC
health effects. A model of trade health effects
must take into account these differences.
VOCs of a variety of sorts are traded in the
SCAQMD credit trading system. Refinery
marine terminals in San Pedro emit benzene,
toluene, hexane, xylenes, ethylbenzene, and
other substances.216 Benzene is a known (Class
"A") carcinogen.217 There is no threshold for its
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208. Id.
209. 42 USC § 7408(f)(1)(c).
210. Executive Order 13045, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,885 (Apr. 23, 1997).
211. For population over 65, regressing total population
density against population density over 65, the linear model:
(density) = 10.57(density over 65) + 97.917 produces an α for den-
sity over 65 of 0.000 and an R2 of 0.807. Model generated and eval-
uated using STATA software package, described supra note 136.
212. Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Pollution Trading And
Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles' Failed Experiment In Air Quality
Policy, 9 DUKE ENV. L. & POL’Y J. 231, 285 (1999).
213. Compare definition at SCAQMD R.102.
214. Drury, supra note 212.
215. See infra note 224.
216. Letter from Henry Hogo, SCAQMD, to USEPA Region
IX regarding Rule 1610 Environmental Justice Task Force
Information Request, at Table 2-2.
217. EPA IRIS document for Benzene (CASRN 71-43-2,








Over 65 Users 37 49 49
Sources 114 61 116
Under 18 Users 91 119 156
Sources 371 169 298
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as a carcinogen, but it does produce chronic
health effects.219 With no identified NOAEL,
exposure can damage the neurological system
and other organ systems. Phenols, another
group of VOCs, are not classed as human car-
cinogens.220 The effects of other substances are
uncertain.  Formaldehyde is classed as a "B1,"
or possible human carcinogen.221 Among the
carcinogens alone, the risk of cancer posed by
a unit of exposure varies tremendously
depending on the substance involved.222 The
substances — carcinogens and non-carcino-
gens — produce a wide range of effects on the
human body. For example, while 0.8 µg/m3 of
formaldehyde is associated with a 1 in 100,000
risk of cancer, the same risk is associated with
between 1.3 to 4.5 µg/m3 of Benzene.223 Clearly,
the substance traded makes a difference for
localized health risk.  In the emissions trading
context, this means that differences in the
VOCs emitted between source and user facili-
ties may change health risk. Again, trades on
the margin of command and control regula-
tions based on aggregate VOC emissions that
ignore the health effect differences from differ-
ent substances can produce net-adverse out-
comes from a morbidity and mortality perspec-
tive.
In the controversy surrounding SCAQMD's
car scrapping program, environmentalists
raised this issue of inter-VOC differences in the
context of a Title VI complaint.224 Their analysis
focused on the health effect differences
between the VOCs emitted by the scrapped
vehicles and the VOCs allegedly emitted by the
oil refineries and marine terminals forgoing
technologically produced emissions limita-
tions.225
E. Excess Disease Burden From Non-
Carcinogenic Effects
The same basic approach applies to non-
carcinogenic as to carcinogenic health effects
analysis. Dose and response information is
used to derive a curve that shows the level at
which an exposure will on average cause a risk
of certain adverse human health effects. But in
the non-carcinogen case, dose and response
often exhibit a threshold effect.226 In other
words, there is a level of exposure tolerated by
the human body that will not produce any
effect on biological processes. Increases in
exposure above that threshold level produce
biologically measurable effects. As noted,
exposure at the threshold level can be
described as a HI of 1. For this reason, the first
effect of interest for a non-carcinogen emission
is whether it causes the population impacted
to reach a HI=1 threshold dose. Evaluating this
question requires knowledge of both the emis-
sion in question, and of the background level
of exposure for a community. For example, if a
new source of emissions will add a HI of 0.2,
this new emission is not in and of itself enough
to trigger a biological response.227 But if the
new emission comes in a community with a
baseline HI of 0.9 for the same organ system,
the new emissions will create an environmen-
tal exposure level likely to cause injury or ill-
ness.
VOCs are not the only pollutants that can
cause localized non-carcinogenic health
effects. Research indicates that oxides of nitro-
gen can also cause such effects.228 Recent stud-
ies suggested that NOx can have adverse
impacts at levels below the current EPA
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219. EPA IRIS Document for Toluene. (CASRN 108-88-3,
updated April 1, 1994).
220. EPA IRIS Document for Phenol (CASRN 108-95-2,
updated Mar. 1, 1991).
221. EPA IRIS Document for Formaldehyde (CASRN 50-00-
0, updated May 1, 1991).
222. Supra note 217.
223. Id.
224. Letter from Henry Hogo, supra note 216 at Att. 7.
225. Id.
226. See Discussion of threshold concept at notes 140-41.
227. Threshold analysis relies on our scientific knowledge
about low-level effects. If the threshold level is based on an
underestimation of low-level effects, the HI will similarly under-
estimate the harm to exposed individuals.
228. Costa & Amdur, supra note 117 at 857, 876.
229. Schwartz, et al., supra note 207 (arguing that the
health effects of air pollution in causing chronic illness are under-
estimated).
Assessing the net effect on health burden
from a trade between a source and user is more
complicated for non-carcinogens than it is for
carcinogens. These trades may be grouped into
three classes. The first involves credit migra-
tions from either threshold or non-threshold230
areas to non-threshold areas. Such trades yield
a reduction or steady level of local health bur-
den and do not create inefficiencies because of
market failures. The second group is composed
of trades from non-threshold to threshold
areas. By their nature, these trades involve an
increased burden on local health. They
imposed no burden at the source, because of
the non-threshold nature of that exposure, but
cause a breach of threshold exposure and
therefore impose a health burden upon the
user community. Such trades are inefficient. A
third class of trades, from threshold to thresh-
old, is more problematic. Comparing trades
above the threshold is difficult. Where the type
of health effect is the same in both the source
and user communities, the comparative bur-
den on health may be determined by compar-
ing the number of individuals exposed at each
location. But where the substance or amount
of the substance varies between source and
user, as might be the case in a trade of two dif-
ferent VOCs, the comparison becomes a bal-
ance between the health effects of the above-
threshold exposures231 and the size of the pop-
ulations involved. Comparing the hazard
indices can provide a useful if inexact proxy for
health effects where the effects of exposure
over a hazard index are unknown.232 This bal-
ance may or may not present a clear result, as
it can involve weighing the burden posed by
various classes of illness and injury.
F. Existing Safety Valves Within the System
The market failures produced by the blind-
ness of emissions trading programs may be
partially mitigated by a jurisdiction's other
rules relating to trading or health risk. Some
jurisdictions have responded to concerns
about "hot spots". SCAQMD prohibits trades
that would forego the achievement of a 1x10-5
reduction in cancer risk from a facility.233 Other
district rules prohibit facilities from emitting
"hazardous air pollutants"234 which create expo-
sures at a Hazard Index of 5 or carcinogenic
health risk of 100x10-9.235 Other approaches
require risk assessments and allow discre-
tionary denial of new source approval.236
SCAQMD may deny a permit to a facility that
imposes an increased cancer risk of 1x10-5 or
causes a 0.5 risk that it will produce one cancer
within an exposed population.237 These discre-
tionary safety valves are the result of state level
regulation of local air quality authorities.238
Other similar requirements mandate public
notification where emissions of "toxic air con-
taminants" exceed certain levels.239
Rules governing emissions trading markets
may also reduce the number of trades produc-
ing a net negative effect. Some jurisdictions
have imposed "ratio" requirements upon
trades — requiring that purchase of a unit of
foregone emissions only allows the new emis-
sion of a fraction of the amount of foregone
emissions. SMAQMD requires ratios of 1.2 for
trades within 15 miles and 2 for trades from a
greater distance.240 Again, while reducing any
likely increased health effect from "inefficient"
trades, the blindness of the system to health
effects may still allow trades across greater
population density gradients or for emissions
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230. For the purposes of this discussion the classification
that a source or user area as threshold or non-threshold is made
by including the credits to be the subject of the proposed trade.
231. See discussion of the LOAEL — the trigger dosage
levels for health effect above the NOAEL, supra text accompany-
ing note 114.
232. See SCAQMD Regulation XIV, Rule 1402, using a HI=5
standard to evaluate emissions of certain hazardous substances.
233. SCAQMD R. 2501(E)(1)(a)(i).
234. 189 hazardous air pollutants ("HAP") were designated
in the CAA.
235. SCAQMD Regulation XIV (AQMD, 1999).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. 17 Cal. Code Regs. § 91506 (Barclay's 2000).
239. 17 Cal. Code Regs. § 91506(l) (Barclay’s 2000).
240. See, e.g., Sacramento Air Quality Management District
Rule 303.1; SCAQMD Regulation XIII (AQMD 1999).
cured by this imprecise tool, the ratio require-
ment. The BAAQMD study results are instruc-
tive. They show that "inefficient" trades went to
areas with, on average, 8.7 times the popula-
tion density as the source communities. While
only a very rough model of the market, this
suggests that current ratio levels241 may be
wholly inadequate to the task of preventing
trades from producing an increase in morbidi-
ty and mortality.
As trading regimes proliferate, a variety of
background regulations may mitigate the
health inefficiencies in aggregate credit trading
systems. They offer important ways to deal
with the distributional inequities of concen-
trating pollution in "hot spots" that the single-
minded adoption of a health effects critique
may not recognize. But such approaches run
the risk, as in the case of rations, of allowing
some trades that produce a net increase in
morbidity and mortality.
VI. Building a Model to Address Health
Risk — Creating a Health Backstop.
The dominant model for emissions trading
— aggregate emissions trading — is blind to
the local health effects of trades. As discussed,
its assumption that stack emissions are fungi-
ble is incorrect. VOCs can have localized health
effects — both carcinogenic and non-carcino-
genic — upon surrounding communities. As
the BAAQMD data shows, trades in such sys-
tems run the risk of producing net increases in
morbidity and mortality. In other words, the
current system addresses only one of three
axes along which the impacts of current emis-
sions trades can be measured — the effects of
emissions on total pollution in an air district. It
ignores the other two axes — local carcino-
genic and non-carcinogenic health effects. The
purpose of this analysis is not to disparage the
importance of aggregate pollution and contri-
butions of VOCs to photochemical smog; or to
understate the deficiencies in our knowledge
of toxic substances,242 but rather to advocate an
aspirational no-harm standard for trades that
operate on these three axes simultaneously.
A model arranged along these three axes
would integrate the total emissions model cur-
rently applied with the methods of carcino-
genic and non-carcinogenic health risk analy-
sis, set forth at section V. If a conventionally
structured emissions trading system produces
trading outcomes different from those of this
proposed model, it tolerates trades on the
margin of a command and control structure
that place an increased burden on human
health without a reduction in aggregate emis-
sions. Integrating health effects concerns into
a conventional market in the manner described
would create a health backstop, preventing
trades that produce a net increase in adverse
health effects.
This proposed three-axis model is also
subject to fair criticism. The model is adminis-
tratively more complex than the current sys-
tem. At the same time, the principal cost creat-
ed by that added complexity would be in the
generation of information modeling the effects
of trades on communities. If effectively prom-
ulgated, the information produced may both
motivate communities to become involved in
siting questions, and provide a tool for com-
munity advocacy. The information gathering
processes involved in this health backstop
model can also be used to produce informa-
tion on the distributional effects of pollution
trading from an environmental justice perspec-
tive.243
The proposed system relies on estimating
heath effects. Such estimates are bounded by
uncertainty and vary widely.244 Risk assessment
methods continue to evolve.245 While impor-
tant, this uncertainty in the effects of haz-
ardous substances on human populations
should not block implementation of a health
backstop. The alternative to addressing this
issue using the limited information we do have
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241. SCAQMD Regulation XIII (AQMD 1999).
242. Costa & Amdur, supra note 117 at 857-60.
243. See Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk
Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,960 (Apr. 23, 1996).
244. Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas McGarity, Not so
Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE
L.J. 729, 731 (1991).
245. See, e.g., USEPA, Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen
Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 17960 (Apr. 23, 1996).
taken by market systems blind to local health
effects.246 The answer to the problem of inade-
quate information is not to refrain from action.
Rather, trading markets should adopt health
backstop policies consistent with the precau-
tionary principal and sensitive to advances in
risk assessment and toxicology.247 The three-
dimensional backstop model may also be crit-
icized for lumping all cancer and non-cancer
health effects into its "no harm" focus, rather
than adopting a more nuanced view of the
degree of burden imposed by various illnesses
and injuries. This concern is most evident in
the context of threshold area to threshold area
trades of non-carcinogens. The problem posed
by these analyses is determining which illness
or risk of illness is less desirable and therefore
more important to avoid. Risk trade-offs are
less amenable to bright line rules, but this type
of decision is still made on a regularized basis.
The classic example is the patient attempting
to balance the risks of a medical treatment
against the effects of a disease without treat-
ment.248 Some theorists have developed
indices which attempt to aggregate and model
the decisions of individuals. Quality Adjusted
Life Years (“QUALYs”)249 and Disability
Adjusted Life Years (“DALYs”)250 are two such
indices. They attempt to create a common "cur-
rency" to enable risk-risk comparisons between
injury and illness health outcomes. But there
are substantial uncertainties in the QUALY and
DALY models that counsel against adopting a
common market for assessing carcinogen and
non-carcinogen effects.  Rather, such indices
should be a helpful but non-exclusive input for
discretionary balancing based upon societal
beliefs about risk and guided by public partici-
pation.251
This model need not and should not dis-
place current initiatives to avoid hot spots and
assist overburdened communities for reasons
of equity and fairness. It is intended to force
the model to consider health effects on local
communities as part of a utilitarian check on
the impact of trading on aggregate health risk,
and to force data production regarding those
effects. This data production element allows it
to compliment rather than displace Title VI and
other disparate impact analyses, which provide
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246. The precautionary principle provides guidance on
this issue.  Choosing not to act in the face of scientific uncertain-
ty because of that uncertainty conflicts with the principle.
247. See generally USEPA, Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen
Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 17960 (Apr. 23, 1996);
The impact of erroneous risk measurements on a health
backstop model is easily over-stated. This paper has described
two principal methods by which trades can cause a net increase
in disease burden — allowing increases in the size of the com-
munity exposed and in the health risk of the substance to which
they are exposed.  Errors in estimating toxicity should only
impact those trades where there is a change in the substance
emitted between source and user. Where the same substance is
traded, and similarly cautious protocols used in estimating the
population exposed, the paired nature of the comparison should
reduce some errors in estimating the population exposed and the
level of exposure.
To offer a more concrete example, assume two fishermen
are engaged in an exchange of fish — Halibut for Cod. Each is
required by regulation to under-count the number of fish, which
is counted by estimating the number of fish in a fully packed
crate. If both Halibut and Cod are under counted, the actual
amount exchanged may have been mis-estimated, but the con-
stant mis-counting should have still yielded an equal exchange.
If our goal is avoiding health risk increases produced by a trade,
accurate measurement of risk is less important than having equal
error in measuring sources and users. This critique would, how-
ever, be applicable to attempts to integrate the three axis of the
proposed model into a single index. Just as EPA has (cautiously)
proposed initiatives for interpollutant trading, an index might be
developed to allow trading between locally induced health risks
and aggregate pollutant emission regional health and natural
resources effects.
248. See generally discussions throughout MICHAEL
DRUMMOND ET AL., METHODS FOR THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF HEALTH
CARE PROGRAMMES, 2D ED. (1997); GOLD ET AL. EDS, COST
EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE (1996).
249. See, e.g., MICHAEL DRUMMOND ET AL., METHODS FOR THE
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF HEALTH CARE PROGRAMMES, 2D ED. (1997) 165
(discussing the development of the QUALY to compare the utili-
ty associated by patients with life with dialysis in comparison
with life after a successful kidney transplant); American Trucking
Association v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir .1999) (discussing the
use of QUALYS in the public health care financing context).
250. Lipscomb, et al., Time Preference, in GOLD ET AL. EDS,
COST EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE 231 (1996).
251. Some commentators have noted the importance of
structuring pollution trading markets in ways that enable public
participation. See Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing
Democracy, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 300, 343 (1995) ("However, if pollu-
tion trading programs do not assure meaningful citizen partici-
pation in decisions about the environment, then the distribu-
tional objection goes unmet: some unconsenting citizens must
endure greater pollution, in the service of reducing the overall
costs of environmental compliance.") Id. 
VII. Implications for Action — Legal Tactics
for Bringing Health Effects Based
Challenges to Trading Markets.
A health-based perspective on market out-
comes provides a reason for challenging trades
and trading systems that produce a net
increase in adverse health effects. It also pro-
vides an additional reason for challenging spe-
cific trades that burden low-income communi-
ties of color where those trades also increase
morbidity and mortality. But this approach is
not simply a policy-analytical tool.
The CAA and analogous state statutes and
implementing regulations provide opportuni-
ties to make legal challenges to emissions
trades and trading programs that increase net
health risk.252 Such challenges can be applied in
the environmental justice context, supple-
menting the legal tool kit of advocates, along
with procedural challenges and disparate
impact analyses. In addition to litigation
strategies, shared jurisdiction over air quality
regulation between federal, state, and local
authorities provides multiple loci for legisla-
tive and administrative advocacy supporting
the introduction of data production and health
backstop requirements into emissions credit
programs.
1. Challenges to Permitting Decisions
and Programs
a. Federal Tactics
Trades that increase net health risk also
increase the adverse effects of air pollution,
and therefore violate the CAA. The Act allows
citizen suits against the EPA and other parties
for violation of air quality standards, imple-
mentation plans, or emission requirements,253
or to require the EPA to perform a non-discre-
tionary duty.254 In Sierra Club v. Ruckleshaus,255 the
Sierra Club sued the EPA for its failure to pro-
hibit pollution increases in "attainment areas"
— areas that complied with the National
Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS").256
Prior to the enactment of the EPA's "prevention
of significant deterioration" ("PSD") regula-
tions,257 the EPA had held that the CAA did not
reach emissions-based deterioration in air
quality that did not cause a violation of the
NAAQS.258 Overruling the EPA, the court in
Sierra Club observed that:
In Section 101(b) of the Clean Air Act,
Congress states four basic purposes of
the Act, the first of which is "to protect
and enhance the quality of the
Nation's air resources so as to pro-
mote the public health and welfare
and the productive capacity of its pop-
ulation." 42 U.S.C. S 1857(b) (1). On
its face, this language would appear to
declare Congress' intent to improve
the quality of the nation's air and to
prevent deterioration of that air quali-
ty, no matter how presently pure that
quality in some sections of the coun-
try happens to be.259
The court concluded that:
"[h]aving considered the stated pur-
pose of the Clean Air Act of 1970, the
legislative history of the Act and its
predecessor, and the past and present
administrative interpretation of the
Act, it is our judgment that the Clean
Air Act of 1970 is based in important
part on a policy of non-degradation of
existing clean air."260
Just as in Sierra Club, emissions credit
trades on the margin of command and control
regulations that produce a net increase in
health effects produce an effective increase in
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252. 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
253. Id.
254. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(c).
255. 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972) aff'd 1972 WL 2725, 2
Envtl. L. Rep. 20,656 (C.A.D.C.).
256. The NAAQS are discussed supra, text accompanying
notes 12.
257. Later adopted into the CAA through regulation, 40
CFR 50.2, and in 1977 through an amendment to Title I, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7401.
258. Sierra Club v. Ruckleshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253, 255 (D.D.C.
1972).
259.   Id.
260. Id. at 256.
The Act's language shows a clear intent to
prevent increases in the adverse effects air pol-
lution has on human health. As noted by the
court in Sierra Club, the Act contains a variety of
references to the importance of protecting
human health. It is intended to "…promote the
public health."261 Primary standards under the
Act are based upon human health considera-
tions,262 and must consider the effects of pollu-
tion on the health of sensitive or susceptible
groups or individuals.263 Other portions of the
Act focus on research into the human health
effects of pollutants264 and the development of
specific programs to control locally hazardous
air pollutants. Actions that increase the
adverse health effects of pollution conflict with
the basic policy of the CAA found in its text and
described by the court in Sierra Club v.
Ruckleshaus.265 As such, the Act should be inter-
preted to prohibit emissions credit trades that
produce net negative health effects. A contrary
position by the EPA would be sufficiently in
conflict with the Act's clearly stated intent to
fall outside the appropriate scope of Chevron’s266
deference to an agency's interpretation of a
statute.
b. State Law Approaches
The delegation of authority under the CAA
to state and local agencies provides additional
venues and sources of law for litigating chal-
lenges to local agency approval of emissions
credit trades which increase aggregate health
risk.
California provides an illustration of the
tools that may be available within state law.
Like its federal analog, California's Clean Air
Act provides a strong statement that it is
intended to maintain and improve air quality267
and to produce "healthful air."268 The parallel
purpose guiding the two texts supports a read-
ing of the California Act to prohibit actions that
reduce air quality, as was described in Sierra
Club269 interpreting the CAA.
Unique state statutory provisions can also
be used to support net health effects-based
challenges to trades. As an example, the
California statute requires that market-based
incentives may not delay, postpone, or hinder
compliance with the California Clean Air Act.270
It requires that trades produce a net air quality
benefit,271 and that market-based reductions in
emissions must be at least as effective as those
that would have been produced by a command
and control system.272 Emissions reduction
credits can only offset new emissions if the
credit source's reduction in emissions is "com-
parable" to reductions under a command and
control system.273 Statutory language mandat-
ing equally effective or comparable emissions
reductions, when read in the context of legisla-
tive provisions focused on reducing the
adverse health effects of pollution,274 is suffi-
ciently broad to encompass and support
claims based on net health effects analysis.275
2. Reform Via Legislation and
Administrative Action
Legislative and administrative fora also
provide opportunities to institute net health
effects backstops. Legislative advocacy may
prompt the adoption of health backstop
requirements directly, as well as standards
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261. 42 U.S.C. § 1857(b)(1).
262. 42 U.S.C.§§ 7408(a)(1)(A), 7409.
263. 42 USC § 7408(f)(1)(C).
264. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7403(d); (f)(1).
265. See 344 F. Supp. 253; supra text accompanying note
201.
266. See Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (requiring
judicial deference to administrative agency interpretations of the
statutes implemented by the agency in question absent a conflict
with clear legislative intent).
267. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39607.5(A) (Deering
2001).
268. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40910 (Deering 2001).
269. Sierra Club, 344 F. Supp. at 253.
270. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39616(c) (Deering 2001).
271. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40440.10-11 (Deering
2001).
272. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39616(c)(1) (Deering
2001).
273. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40713 (Deering 2001).
274. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40910; § 41700 (Deering
2001).
275. Such provisions are not limited to California. Illinois,
home to the Chicago VOC emissions trading market has a Clean
Air Act designed to "restore, maintain, and enhance the purity of
the air." 415 Ill.Code 5/8 (West Supp. 1999).
require the modeling of localized health
effects.
a. Part One: Facilitate Data
Gathering
Both Title VI disparate impact analysis and
net-disease-burden analysis rely on accurate
information about transactions in an emis-
sions market.  They require data on the loca-
tion of sources and users of credits, as well as
information on the magnitude of the trades
that will be used to derive dispersion models.276
Net disease burden analysis also requires
information on population distribution and
chemical speciation — information on exactly
what types of chemicals are involved.
Disparate impact analysis focuses instead on
the location of minority populations.
Mechanisms currently in place to collect,
assemble, and distribute this information are
inadequate. Of three major California air qual-
ity districts contacted to developing the data
presented in this paper, none were readily able
to provide credit trade information linked with
VOC speciation.277 Another was unable to
assemble data on the pairing of sources and
users for each transaction without a lengthy,
manual sorting of sources and users.278 The
existence of this data and its availability in a
usable form to regulators, permit applicants,
environmental justice advocates, and the com-
munities impacted by trades, is essential to
provoke dialogue on the effects of the system,
and to facilitate Title VI and net health effects
inquiries.279
The current state-level emissions trading
data collection and reporting system in
California requires that agencies report data
from each completed emissions reduction
credit trade.280 But the only information gath-
ered relates to the class of substance traded,
the size of the trade and the price paid per
ton.281 The system neither collects nor reports
data on the identity or location of the parties
involved in the trade.282 Like the market itself,
this data gathering system is blind to health
effects. Its only focus is on the price of the
credits in the market. Illinois regulations gov-
erning emissions credit trading require the
reporting of more extensive data, as well as the
development of a computerized bulletin board
to provide data on emissions credits.283 The test
of the Illinois system will be in implementation
— what data will be collected, how will it be
presented, and will it be presented in a forum
useful to communities? A model for state ini-
tiatives in making such data available already
exists in the form of the EPA's "envirofacts"
database integrating site and facility data from
a variety of environmental data sources into a
relatively user-friendly interface.284
Data collection has been an issue of grow-
ing prominence in the context of racial profil-
ing and of disproportionate use of Terry285 stops
against members of minority communities.
Critics of racial profiling have intensified
efforts to force data collection and distribu-
tion.286 The data is not an end, but a means to
describe the problem and provoke discourse
and action in legal, administrative, and legisla-
tive fora. For the same reasons, data collection
is an important step in developing attacks on
emissions trading grounded in disparate
impact and aggregate health effects analyses.
b. Part Two: A No-Harm
Requirement
If trades exist to provide flexibility in com-
plying with command and control emissions
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276. See Tit. 6 Guidance Document, supra note 148.
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286. See, e.g., Lisa Walter, Eradicating Racial Stereotyping From
Terry Stops: The Case for an Equal Protection Exclusionary Rule, 71 COLO.
L. REV. 255, 274 (1999) (discussing litigation by Atty. Robert
Wilkins against the Maryland State Police).
aggregate burden of morbidity and mortality
above that produced under a purely command
and control system. In other terms, a trade
should not produce a net increase in adverse
health effects. This can be described as a "no
harm" standard. The multi-factor analysis
(described supra) is designed to ensure that
trades are efficient on three axes — airshed,
cancer, and non-cancer health effects. By
blocking trades that increase aggregate burden
on human health, a no-harm standard would
create a backstop requirement for the protec-
tion of health.
This inquiry would require data on the spe-
ciation of the substances emitted, their health
risks, geographic distribution of population,
and modeling data to describe the dispersion
of emissions in a local community. Where
threshold non-carcinogens are involved, infor-
mation on background levels of substances
that produce non-carcinogenic effects would
also be required. The decision rules set forth
previously in this paper would be applied to
assess whether a trade increased aggregate
health risk. Trades from non-carcinogenic
threshold to threshold areas should apply haz-
ard index comparisons as part of a mixed qual-
itative and quantitative risk assessment
process.
Such a model is admittedly aspirational.
But creating the infrastructure required to eval-
uate trades would not require the development
of any new technologies. Population, disper-
sion and substance health effects data are pub-
licly available, but should be integrated and
presented so as to be usable for such analyses.
Speciation data should also be reported and
made readily available as part of the permitting
process. Modeling and geographic relation of
emissions to populations is achievable
through current computer modeling systems.287
Regulatory guidance defining the emissions
model and assumptions to be used in model-
ing would reduce compliance costs and pro-
mote equivalency in credit valuation, and
reduce incentives and opportunities for strate-
gic negative behavior by market participants.288
A health backstop could prove a useful tool
to challenge trades and trading systems both
generally, and as they impact communities of
color.289
VIII. Conclusion
Public health's population perspective pro-
vides a useful approach for evaluating emis-
sions credit trading systems. Health based effi-
ciency critiques offer advocates for environ-
mental justice another tool to add to process
and equity based challenges. The BAAQMD
data analysis suggests that emissions credit
systems can cause the migration of emissions
in ways that increase net adverse health
effects.  Currently formulated pollution mar-
kets are blind to these effects, and differences
in toxicant and community characteristics that
underlie them. The net negative effect of these
trades runs afoul of the promise of emissions
trading as a source of flexibility for polluters
that will not hamper efforts to reduce the
adverse effects of air pollution.
The failures of the current market to
address the health effects of trading provides
opportunities for environmental justice advo-
cates when these "inefficient" trades occur in
low income communities of color. Challenges
to such trades and systems may be formulated
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287. Leon R. Leonard, AIR QUALITY PERMITTING, CRC/Lewis
Publishers (1997) 100 (discussing models such as the EPA's
"Industrial Source Complex 3/ISC3" and SCREEN models).
288. The growth of an industry of brokers who are repeat
players in the trading markets, as well as repeat large purchasers
provides a constituency with an interest in developing and fund-
ing developments in this needed infrastructure.
289. Adding a backstop requirement also avoids an out-
right commodification of rights to injure and cause illness. Such a
commodification might prove even more troubling than the cur-
rent system from the perspective of critics such as Sandel. See dis-
cussion of moral attacks upon emissions trading, supra note 73.
290. See, e.g., Marla Cone, Judge Rules Smog Cutbacks Illegal,
LA TIMES, Oct. 6 1998 A1 (Discussing Clean Air Act SIP approval-
based challenge to local emissions trading rule.); Communities for
a Better Env't v. Unocal Corp., No. 97-5414 (C.D. Cal. filed July 23,
1997); Communities for a Better Env't v. Ultramar Corp., No. 97-5413
(C.D. Cal. filed July 23, 1997); Communities for a Better Env't v. Chevron
Corp., No. 97-5412 (C.D. Cal. filed July 23, 1997); Communities for a
Better Env't v. Tosco Corp., No. 97-5411 (C.D. Cal. filed July 23, 1997);
Communities for a Better Env't v. GATX Capital Corp., No. 97-5410 (C.D.
Cal. filed July 23, 1997).
Trades that result in harm to human health vio-
late the Act's goal of prevention deterioration
when read in the context of its focus on the
human health effects of pollution. Given the
weakness of Title VI as a tool for environmental
justice litigation, a net-health-effects based
approach should be added to more traditional
process based arguments under the CAA and
other statutes.290
A health effects based approach may also
serve as the basis for legislative action at state
and federal levels. Such actions might include
(1) the adoption of data gathering require-
ments to facilitate both disparate impact and
health effects analysis, and (2) the adoption of
statutory net health effects requirements to
support litigation-based approaches.
As the number of emissions credit systems
grows, net health effects based approaches
provide an additional opportunity for activism
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